(1.) This petition has come up for hearing and final disposal after being dismissed for default twice during its pendency for over 10 years and it was extensively argued by learned counsel, Mr S.V. Parmar.
(2.) The petitioner is stated to be a member of backward class and a landless labourer who earned his livelihood by honest means of labour and, having been settled in a family, he was aggrieved by the impugned order dated 27.7.1995 of his externment for six months. Admittedly, that order was carried in appeal before Dy.Secretary and the appeal was also dismissed by order dated 21.12.1995.
(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that provisions of section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 did not apply to the facts of the case and the findings recorded in the impugned order by the competent authority were perverse insofar as they were not supported by the material or facts on record. He further submitted that the impugned order was made in mala fide exercise of power which was apparent from the concluding remarks, made in the impugned order, to the effect that witnesses of the petitioner were not reliable, that he was earning his livelihood by labour and he belongs to a backward class, considering which he had to be externed. He further submitted that the statements and allegations against the petitioner were vague and they could not have been pressed into service for violating the fundamental rights of a citizen enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. The learned counsel relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Prem Chand v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 639 and in Smt. Bimla Dewan v. Lieutenant-Governor of Delhi (1982) 2 SCC 469 in support of his submissions that, mere police apprehension, in absence of a clear and present danger based upon credible material, would not be enough to proceed against a person; and that individual actions which did not disturb the even tempo of life in the society or does not cause apprehension in the minds of the residents in regard to maintenance of public order, cannot amount to interference with the maintenance of public order.