(1.) Petitioner, accused of Sec. 20(b) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ('N.D.P.S. Act') and Sec. 66(1)(b) and Sec. 65(A) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, was arrested on 14-2-1995. On 18-5-1995, petitioner-accused filed an application for bail on the ground that period of 90 days as contemplated under Sec. 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Code' for short) from the date of his arrest has expired and as the charge-sheet is not filed, he is entitled to be released on bail on default of the prosecuting agency and he be ordered to be released on bail. Said application was heard and finally decided on 25-5-1995 and came to be rejected on 30-5-1995 by the learned Adl. Sessions Judge, Valsad. It is stated that in the meantime, i.e., on 24-5-1995, charge-sheet came to be submitted. It will be relevant to state that the petitioner-accused has also submitted an application before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge with a request to prevent the investigating agency not to file charge-sheet till the disposal of his bail application. However, it appears that no order is passed on the said application, as it appears that the application must have become infructuous in view of the fact that the charge-sheet is submitted before the Court.
(2.) Learned Addl. Sessions Judge by his order dated 30-5-1995 rejected the said bail application, being Misc. Criminal (Bail) Application No 303 of 1995. The petitioner herein being aggrieved by the said judgment and order and also claiming an independent right of being released on bail, has filed this application.
(3.) Learned Advocate Mr. Shah has raised two important questions before this Court, namely, (i) what would be the position if after the expiry of the prescribed time as envisaged under Sec. 167 of the Code an application is submitted before the competent Court and during the pendency of the said application, i.e., before the decision of the application, the charge-sheet is submitted ? and (ii) Can the inaction on the part of the concerned Court take away the absolute right of the accused, which is vested by the legislative command and not the Court's discretion merely on the ground that though the application under Sec. 167(2) was made immediately after expiry of 90 days, but before the said application could be decided by the concerned Court, the investigating agency submitted the charge-sheet ?