LAWS(GJH)-1996-4-44

UDESING MATHURBHAI Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

Decided On April 24, 1996
UDESING MATHTIRBHAI Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners filed this special civil application for direction to the respondents to pay to the petitioners interest at the rate of 18% from the date of their reinstatement till they received the amount. The facts which are necessary for disposal of the writ petition briefly stated, are as follows: While the petitioners were serving as unarmed police constables in the City of Ahmedabad, respondent No. 2, vide order dated 25th November, 1975, terminated their services with effect from 19th December, 1975. The petitioners felt aggrieved by the termination of their services and approached the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, by filing regular civil suit No. 1789 of 1976. The city civil court decided the civil suit. I may observed that the advocates are taking the matters causally. In para 3.2 the date of termination has been stated as 26th November, 1995. From para 3.3 onwards the number of civil suit has been stated as 3785 of 1976. The adovcates do not care to see that there are no typing mistakes in the writ petition before presenting the same before the Court. Be that as it may. After such long time of pendency of the writ petition I do not consider it proper to dismiss the writ petition on this technical ground. Otherwise, looking to the facts stated aforesaid, serious view of the matter is required to be taken. The civil suit was decreed by the civil court on 16-4-1980, with the direction for reinstatement of the petitioners with full backwages as if the petitioners had been continued in service without any interruption. The decree of the civil court has been challenged by the respondents by filing civil first appeal No. 1543 of 1980 before this Court. The appeal has also been dismissed on 4-7-1983. Though the petitioners have ben reinstated, they have not been paid their backwages for which they were legally entitled to.

(2.) The writ petition is practically a writ for execution of the decree passed by the 637 Civil Court which has been confirmed by this Court in first appeal. Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper remedy. This court should not permit the extraordinary jurisdiction to be converted into civil court under the ordinary law. The decree passed by the civil court was executable under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. But, instead of resorting to the remedy available under the statute the petitioner have approached this court by way of this writ petition. The Apex Court in the case of Swetamber Sthankwasi Jain Samiti vs. The Alleged Committee of Management, reported in JT 1996 (3) SC 21 held that when suit is pending between two parties the interim miscellaneous orders passed by the trial court, against which remedy of appeal or revision is available, cannot be challenged by way of writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It has further been held that where the civil court has jurisdiction to try a suit the High Court cannot convert it self into appellate or revisional court and interfere with the interim/miscellaneous orders of the civil court. Writ jurisdiction is meant for doing justice between the parties where it cannot be done in any other form. As stated earlier, here in a case where for the relief of nature which has been prayed for by the petitioners in this writ petition proper forum is available under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Though the petition is not maintainable in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court, I do not consider it proper at this stage to dismiss the same on this ground. Otherwise the petitioners may be rendered remedyless.

(3.) The Civil Court passed decree in the present case on 16-4- 1980, and it has been affirmed by this Court in first appeal on 4-7-1983. Limitation for execution of the decree is provided upto 12 years under the Limitation Act. In case the writ petition is dismissed on the aforesaid ground, then the petitioners may not have the limitation for execution of the decree. There is another reason in favour of the petitioners. Rule has been issued by this Court in the writ petition way back in the year 1986, and after keeping this matter pending for all these ten years I do not consider it to be in the interest of justice to dismiss the same on the aforesaid ground.