LAWS(GJH)-1996-10-47

SHAILESH JADAVJI VARIA Vs. SUB REGISTRAR VADODARA

Decided On October 05, 1996
SHAILESH JADAVJI VARIA Appellant
V/S
Sub Registrar Vadodara Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) . (CAV.) All these petitions have been placed before a Larger Bench in view of an order of Reference made by our learned brother N. N. Mathur, J. on 23/03/1995. When the matters were placed for hearing before the learned single Judge, it was contended that the orders passed by different Division Benches were inconsistent and contradictory. There was also discrepancy and disagreement between Full Bench decisions. The learned single Judge felt that there was some conflict between the Full Bench Judgment, "in order to reconcile between two Full Bench Judgments and to have a proper ratio decided to cover a field and also keeping in view of public importance of the issue", it was desirable to refer the matters to a Larger Bench. The Full Bench decisions are Gorva Vibhag Cooperative Housing Societies Association v. State of Gujarat, 1992(1) GLR 654 (First Full Bench) and H. P. Dave v. Sub-Registrar, Rajkot, 1994(2) GLR 1222 (Second Full Bench). The question is what is reasonable time ? Is there any outer limit for referring the question of proper stamp duty ?

(2.) . Section 32A(1) of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 requires the Registering Officer (when he has reason to believe that the consideration set forth in the instrument does not approximate to the market value of the property) to refer the instrument to the Collector for determining the true market value of the property. No period of limitation is provided by the legislature in sub-section (1), whereas the same legislature has provided a period of two years (now six years) in subsec. (4) of the same Sec. 32A which empowers the Collector to call for any instrument suo motu.

(3.) . The contention of the petitioners is that two years (or six years) must be read as the outer limit of reasonable time for exercise of power under Sec. 32(1). The rival contention is that the reasonable time depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no fixed period for exercise of such power can be laid down by judicial pronouncement when even the legislature has thought if fit not to do so.