STANISH KESHAVBHAI CHAUHAN Vs. DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition is filed by the Methodist Church in India which is a registered public charitable trust. The grievance of the petitioner is that the registration of the primary school at Kathlal in Kheda District run by the Trust has been cancelled by respondents on account of three defaults said to have been committed by the Trust. The first default said to have been committed is that the Trust has not given benefit of recommendation of Desai Pay Commission to its employees. Another default is that one retired person has been given employment. The third default is that the services of one of the teachers who was employed for nine years has been terminated.

(2.) Mr. M.C. Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the benefit of Desai Pay Commission had already been given to all the employees of the Trust and this position has not been disputed by the counsel for the respondents. Merely because at one point of time the benefits of recommendations of Desai Pay Commission were not extended to its employees by the Trust, it does not seem to be reasonable to cancel the registration of the school. Instead of cancelling the registration of the institution insistence should have been made to extend the benefits of the Pay Commission to the employees.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the retired person has been given employment in the institution has already been removed from service and as such the second default does not survive. This position has also not been controverted by the counsel for the respondents. So far as the last default is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner made twofold submissions. It has been firstly contended that the employer has a right to terminate the services of its employees in accordance with law. In case the services of one of the techers is terminated in accordance with law it cannot be said to be a default which warrants the penalty of cancellation of registration of the institution. In such cases the proper course for the respondents would have been to consider the legality and propriety of termination and to pass appropriate orders. If the respondents had passed such an order and the same has not been complied with by the petitioner, there would have been justification for initiating action for cancellation of registration and not otherwise. It has next been contended that in a matter of termination of the services of an employees, sufficient remedy is provided to the employee to approach the Department, Tribunal or this Court against the order of termination of services, which has not been done in the present case according to the information of the petitioner.