RUPSINH HIMMATSINH Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Whether the disputed urban residential property is ancestral property or self- acquired one is the issue in focus in this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The petitioners have, thus, questioned the propriety and validity of the order recorded by respondent No. 1-State of Gujarat in Revision Application under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 ("the ULC Act" for brevity) on 19th October 1995 setting aside the order of competent authority-respondent No. 2 dated 15th July 1994.

(2.) The petitioners are holding the land bearing final plot No. 61 of Town Planning Scheme No. 8 admeasuring about 4811 square metres. The petitioners had sold 1427.97 square metres of land before the ULC Act comjng into force. As per the case of the petitioners, they have acquired the land in question through ancestral right as "protected tenant" from the "Parsi Panchayat Board" by registered sale deed dated 1st November 1969. Thus, the petitioners' ancestors were tenants in respect the land in question since more than 75 years.

(3.) The petitioners filed Form No. 1 under Section 6 of the ULC Act which was disposed of by the competent authority- respondent No. 2, on 14-11-1980, declaring 1917 square metres of land as excess and vacant land against which the petitioner had preferred an appeal under Section 33 of the ULC Act which was dismissed by the Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal, Ahmedabad, on 16-5-1981. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the petitioner had filed Special Civil ApplicationL No. 3960 of 1984 before this Court and this Court passed order on 29-1-1994 that the petitioners are holding land as an "ancestral property". This' Court also found that the petitioners cannot be treated as an association of persons "or a body of individuals for the purpose of ULC Act on account of the fact that the petitioners' father was a "protected tenant". The petitioners acquired the title to the said land as members of the family. Therefore, It was decided by this Court that the petitioners could not be styled as an association of persons or a body of individuals and the matter came to be remanded to respondent No. 2-compctent authority for a fresh decision in the light of the order of this Court.