MUNSHIRAM D ANAND Vs. PRAVINSINH PRABHATSINH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Civil Appeal is preferred by original opponent No. 1 in petition filed under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary) at Jamnagar. The opponent Pravinsinh Prabhatsinh instituted such petition under Sec. 140 of the said Act inter alia claiming that on 16/02/1990 around 10.15 in the morning because of rash and negligent driving by the present appellant of his Fiat Car bearing No. GRI 8061 on Jamnagar-Rajkot Road, there was an accident as the car dashed against the scooter and he received multiple injuries including fracture of left leg and foot. He also stated that he has received 50% permanent disability and that he has also filed regular Motor Accident Claim Petition to recover compensation of Rs. 3,66,000.00. He has further stated that during the pendency of such petition, he has filed application at Exh. 18 for interim compensation under Sec. 140 of the said Act. Such application was fixed for hearing by the Tribunal on 22/10/1992 and ultimately by judgment and award dated 22nd of October, 1992, the Tribunal has awarded the interim compensation of Rs. 12,000.00 under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the said amount is deposited by the appellant in the Tribunal.

(2.) Being aggrieved by the judgment and interim award passed by the Tribunal, the owner of the vehicle has preferred the present Civil Appeal and in such First Appeal, Mr. N. K. Phava, appearing with Mr. P. M. Thakker has strenuously urged before this Court that the Tribunal could not have awarded interim compensation of Rs. 12,000.00 as the main Motor Accident Claim Petition which was instituted by the claimant was already dismissed. He submitted that accident admittedly took place on 16th of February, 1990 for which the Motor Accident Claim Petition was filed on 5th of September, 1991, i.e., beyond the maximum period of one year then provided by Sec. 166 of the said Act. Section 166(3) as it then stood contemplated that every application for compensation under Sec. 166(2) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred. Sub-section (3) provides that - no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso, however, contemplated that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant-claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.

(3.) The effect of the aforesaid provision was fully discussed in the case of Mer Ramde Vejanandbhai v. Harshadbhai Parbatbhai, reported in 1992(2) GLR 976 wherein this Court has taken the view that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay over a period of one year from the date of the accident. The petition lies as of right within a period of six months but if there is delay, the Tribunal could condone the same between six months to 12 months and not beyond 12 months. The Parliament has subsequently realised the adverse effect of such provision on the rights of claimants of vehicular accident and has, therefore, by amendment which has come into force w.e.f. 14/11/1994, by Amendment Act No. 54 of 1994, deleted the entire sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The effect of such amendment is that the Motor Accident Claim petition could now be preferred at any point of time as no limitation is prescribed, subject of course to the reasonableness of the period and applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, if at all, same is applicable. Such question is not examined in this First Appeal as it does not directly arise for consideration. However, in the present case, when the petition was filed, on 5th of September, 1991, Sec. 166(3) operated and as per the said provision read with the aforesaid decision of this Court, it was not open to the Tribunal to condone delay and to entertain the petition. The Tribunal has while considering application for condonation of delay filed along with the main petition, by judgment and order dated 7/08/1992, refused to condone delay on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to condone delay under Sec. 166(3) of the said Act. However, the Tribunal has proceeded to pass the order on application for interim compensation which was filed under Sec. 140 of the said Act and, therefore, the Counsel for the appellant submitted that once the main petition for compensation is dismissed as it was beyond the prescribed period of limitation, application for interim compensation was also liable to be dismissed and that the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in passing an award of interim compensation.