NARABHAI VELJIBHAI CHAUDHARY Vs. R S VAGHELA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) .This Special Civil Application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking direction to quash the order dated 28- 10-1995 passed by the Addl. Development Commissioner, State of Gujarat, whereby he set aside the order passed by the respondent No. 2 District Development Officer, Mehsana suspending the respondent No. 3 Akbarbhai Rahimbhai Momin from the office of Sarpanch under the provisions of Sec. 59(1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993.

(2.) The short facts of the case are that the petitioner lodged First Information Report at Sidhpur Police Station on 20-2-1995 stating inter-alia that on the said day the respondent No. 3 alongwith about 7 persons arrived on the spot armed with Dharia and other weapons and attacked on him and others. It is also stated that respondent No. 3 Sarpanch inflicted injuries on his person. On this information, the police registered a case against the respondent and others for offence under Sec. 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 504 and 506(2) of I.P.C. As the respondent No. 3 was holding the office of Sarpanch, the proceeding under Sec. 59(1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") were initiated. After notice, the District Development Officer, Mehsana suspended the respondent No. 3 by order dated 18-9-1995. The suspended Sarpanch -respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal to the State Government against the said order. The appellate authority considering the facts of the case, nature of the offence and also having formed the opinion that Sarpanch was implicated on account of political rivalry set aside the order of the District Development Officer.

(3.) It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there are serious allegations against the respondent No. 3 inasmuch as, that he attacked on the petitioner with deadly weapons like Dharia and caused hurt to him. This act of the respondent No. 3 on the facts of the case constitutes an offence of moral turpitude and as such the respondent No. 1 has exceeded jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the respondent No. 2 District Development Officer. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1996, Guj. 3 (Jorabhai Hirabhai Rabari v. D.D.O., Mehsana). I have gone through the judgment. This Court has held that whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not cannot always be judged in isolation and merely with reference to the ingredients of an offence. The learned Judge explaining the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Thakor Bhagabhai v. D.D.O., Surat and Anr., reported in 1980 (XXI) GLR 966 observed thus :