STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. ISMAIL YUSUF CHHUNGA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been preferred by the applicant-State of Gujarat requesting to condone the delay of 674 days in preferring the Criminal Appeal challenging the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned 9th Additional and Special Judge, Godhra, Camp Sabarmati Central Jail, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as "the learned trial Court") in Sessions Case No.92/2011 by which the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent herein-original accused for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 337, 338, 395, 397, 435, 186, 188, 120(B), 153(A), 212, 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code; for the offences punishable under Sections 141, 150, 151 and 152 of the Indian Railway Act; for the offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of the Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act and Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act.

(2.) Shri Mitesh Amin, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the applicant-State has vehemently submitted that as such there is no deliberate delay on the part of the State in not preferring the Appeal either within the period of limitation and / or to file an Appeal belatedly challenging the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

(3.) The present application is vehemently opposed by Shri A.D. Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-original accused. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-original accused that in the present case as such no sufficient cause has been shown by the State explaining the huge delay of 674 days in preferring the Appeal. It is submitted that in the present case the impugned judgment and order of acquittal has been delivered by the learned trial Court on 30/11/2013. It is submitted that the State was represented by the Special Public Prosecutor. It is submitted that even the learned Public Prosecutor immediately did not even apply for the certified copy of the judgment and order. It is submitted that nothing is on record that any opinion was sent by the learned Special Public Prosecutor to prefer an Appeal. It is submitted that even thereafter a decision was taken to prefer the Appeal in March, 2014. It is submitted that therefore there is no explanation whatsoever for the period between 04/01/2014 to 17/04/2014. It is submitted that even though the decision was taken to prefer an Appeal in the month of April, 2014, State for the reasons best known thought it fit to seek an opinion from the learned Advocate General. It is submitted that the fact that the State even sought opinion of the learned Advocate General and even the concerned Law Minister speaks volumes about the same. It is submitted that seeking opinion of the learned Advocate General and even the Law Minister is not appreciable.