MIRU ADAM RAHIMA Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. P.C. Master, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Uday Bhatt, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents.

(2.) By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners No. 1 to 6 who are working as 'Simrakhas', petitioner No.7 which provides Simrakhas to the land-holders, and petitioner No.8 who claims to be President of Gujarat Khedut Samaj Gujarat, Village Bareja, Taluka Dascroi, District Ahmedabad, are challenging the constitutional validity of Section 2(e), definition of ?Private Armed Force?, Section 3, Section 4 and Section 5 of The Gujarat Prohibition of Maintenance of Private Armed Force Act, 1989 (9 of 1989) submitting inter alia that a bare perusal of the provisions of law would show that these are ultra vires the Constitution, affect the fundamental rights of the petitioners and the landholders and adversely affect their right to livelihood.

(3.) Mr. Master, learned counsel for the petitioners, after taking us through the definition of ?Private Armed Force? contained in Section 2(e), firstly submitted that if the person wants to engage certain people who are not armed, then the provisions of Act would not allow him to engage such people. Referring to Section 3 and 4, he submitted that on one side the Government says that no landholder shall by himself or through any other person keep and maintain any Private Armed Force for protection of land or crop or otherwise and at the same time under Section 4 of the Act the State allows to keep 2 persons as ?Private Armed Force? and also gives an authority to a Gram Panchayat or a Nagar Panchayat as the case may be to allow engagement or employment of more than 2 persons. Referring to Section 5, it was submitted that a person who is employing Private Armed Force has been put to unnecessary restriction, and in a given case the officer in-charge of the police station within whose jurisdiction the land-owner's lands are falling may create problem by not allowing the landowner to engage a particular person or may ask the land-owner to terminate the service of such Private Armed Force. He submitted that the provisions contained in Section 2(e), 3, 4 and 5 if are read in juxtaposition then it would clearly appear that the provisions are ultra vires the Constitution and deserve to be quashed or in the alternative are required to be read down in a manner so that the landowners/landholders and Simrakhas do not suffer unnecessarily.