KAMLABEN Vs. DASHRATHRAO P SHINDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present revision under Sec. 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') is filed by the original defendant Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, whereas the first respondent herein is the original plaintiff and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 respectively.

(2.) Before proceeding with the contentions raised in the present revision, it must be kept in mind that the present revision is one under Sec. 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In the context of the powers of the High Court exercisable in such revisions, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Helper Girdharbhai, AIR 1987 SC 1782 is most relevant. In the said decision the Supreme Court has observed in substnace that in exercising revisional power under Sec. 29(2) the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. But, in the guise of revision, substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding Us jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view in place of that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant.

(3.) It may also be noted that the present revision along with few other similar revisions were referred to a Division Bench of this Court for deciding between two conflicting views taken by different Judges of this Court viz., whether the amendment to Sec. 12(3)(b) of the said Act, by Gujarat Act 7 of 1985, was retrospective in operation or not. This question was considered by a Division Bench consisting of B.N. Kirpal C.J. and S.D. Dave J. and by their decision rendered in the case of Sakarbai Devraj vs. Ibrahim, reported at 35 (2) GLR page 1091, the conflict of decisions now no longer survives. In the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, this Court held that the amendment to Sec. 12(3)(b) of the said Act, whereby the word "regularly" is deleted or omitted is not retrospective in nature, but merely prospective. The said decision of the Division Bench has taken into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court, including the decisions relied upon by me in my decision in CRA No. 1707/79, decided on 29th October, 1991, wherein the view expressed by me has been upheld by the Division Bench. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to reiterate the various Supreme Court decisions afresh herein. Suffice it to say that the omission of the word "regularly" 5 brought about by the amendment referred to hereinabove is merely prospective and not retrospective.