RAMJI KACHARA PADALIYA Vs. PORBANDAR NAGARPALIKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner who is a Councillor of the respondent-Nagarpalika challenges the notice dated 8th February 1995 at Annexure-B to this petition given by the President of the respondent-Nagarpalika postponing the date of Special General Meeting which was called on 9th February 1995 to 6th March 1995 and stating the agenda of that meeting.

(2.) According to the petitioner the Board of the Porbandar Nagarpalika was constituted, on 4th February 1995 and by notice dated 4th February 1995 the President had called. Special General Meeting of the Board on 9th February 1995 at the office of the Nagarpalika to consider the agenda items which included construction of various committee named at items (Nos. 2(1) to 2(12) of the notice. According to the petitioner the meeting was, therefore, convened on 9th February 1995 wherein 22 Councillors remained present. The Chief Officer at the commencement of the meeting brought to the notice of the Councillors not to proceed further as the President had cancelled the said meeting and postponed it to 6th March 1995 as per notice dated 8th February 1995. The Councillors however appointed one of them as a Chairman of the meeting and proceeded with the agenda items of constituting committees. The petitioner apprehending that the meeting called on 6th March 1995 would be convened for the purpose of constituting committees filed this petition and on 6th March 1995, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. K. Keshote while admitting the matter restrained the respondents from holding the meeting on 6th March 1995 for forming committees under the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 till further orders.

(3.) It was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioner that the President had no power to postpone the date of the meeting as the meeting was properly convened or summoned. It was argued that in view of the provisions of Section 51(11) of the said Act a general meeting could be adjourned only with the consent of a majority of Councillors and not by the President. It was also argued that the reason assigned in the impugned notice dated 8th February 1995, that because 7 clear days' notice was not given the date of the meeting was postponed to 6th March 1995, was self contradictoty and since the notice, for a Special General Meeting required 3 clear days' time only as per Section 51(3) of the said Act it should be inferred that cancellation of the meeting under the impugned notice was mala fide and result of the rivalry amongst the Board members. It was also contended that mala fide intention inferred from the fact that the postponement of the meeting was done at the last minute and notice of such postponement was not even served on as many as 23 Councillors who had remained present. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the decision of this Court in Babubhai v. Manibhai reported in 16 G. L. R. 566 and on another decision of the Division Bench in Arun S. Mehta v. Bhavnagar Munucipal Corporation reported in 1989(1) G. L. R. 151 in support of the contention that the President could not have postponed the date of the meeting by the impugned notice. It was argued relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sayabudinsab v. Municipality of Gadag Betgeri reported in AIR 1955 SC 314 that the provision regarding convening the meeting under Section 51(3) was directory and not mandatory and therefore irregularity in the earlier notice dated 4th February 1995 calling the proceedings of the meeting which was actually convened on 9th February 1995. It was also contended that irregularity in the earlier notice if any was not a proper reason for postponing the meeting. Relying on the rules framed by the Municipality it was urged that the meeting could be adjourned only by the members who have convened at the meeting and not by the President.