STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. BOMBAY NOVELTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this appeal under Sec. 397 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Code' for short), the appellant-State has challenged the quantum of punishment in impugned order of sentence passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad City, in Criminal Case No. 274 of 1986, on 10th October 1986.

(2.) The respondents are the original accused. Respondent No. 1 is the proprietory firm and respondent No. 2 is a proprietor who is doing business in the name and style of 'M/s. Bombay Novelty', at Ahmedabad. The respondents were tried in the trial Court in the aforesaid criminal case for the offence punishable under Secs. 18(1)(i) and 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 ('Act' for short). Both the accused persons had pleaded guilty to the charges before the trial Court and they came to be convicted for the said offences. Therefore, both the accused are ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 250.00 and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The State of Gujarat being dissatisfied by the quantum of sentence awarded to the accused has filed this appeal for enhancement of sentence. The original complainant - Drug Inspector raided the shop of the accused persons on 26-2-1985 and seized two boxes of Barcqline Soothing Perfumed Cream tubes. The said tubes did not contain any batch number. 24 tubes were collected by the Drug Inspector. As per provisions of law, on one sample, seal was affixed and the same was forwarded alongwith the letter to the Government Laboratory for examination and report on 26-2-1985. As per the report, sample indicated that there was presence of 11.67 Gms. of Zink Oxide contents in the sample tube. The said tubes were manufactured by one Meena Cosmetics of New Delhi. After receipt of the report, the original complainant-Drug Inspector filed complaint which was registered as Criminal Case No. 274 of 1986 in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, at Ahmedabad, on 12-3-1986 alleging that the accused have committed breach of the provisions of Secs. 18(a)(i) and 18(c) read with Sec. 27A of the Act.

(3.) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the relevant provisions of the Act, it becomes very clear that the impugned order of sentence is not only lenient but it is grossly inadequate and insufficient. The reasons assigned by the trial Court for taking lenient view cannot be upheld and sustained. In fact, matter could have been sent back, but after taking into consideration the intervening long period and the relevant provisions of law, and submissions raised on behalf of the accused that after long delay instead of remanding the matter, it may be decided by this Court in this appeal. The trial Court has also wrongly mentioned the sentence order under the provisions of Sec. 27 of the Act.