KRISHNAKUMAR AGARWAL Vs. APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner challenges through this petition the order Annexure M, dt. 28th April, 1995 passed under S. 269UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961 by the Appropriate Authority for purchasing the property which was the subject matter of agreement to sell between the vendor, respondent No. 2 and the petitioner on 26th Dec., 1994.

(2.) AS per agreement to sell, the property Plot No. 32 in Amarkunj Co op. Housing Society Ltd. on R.S. No. 18 of Mouja Subhanpura, Taluka Baroda, is sold in favour of the petitioner for a lump sum consideration of Rs. 22,00,000. The land area is 8,374 sq. mtrs. The agreement to sell was furnished to the Appropriate Authority in Form No. 37 I in terms of S. 269UC. The Appropriate Authority issued notice under S. 269UD(1A) to show cause notice why the order under S. 269UD(1) should not be made for purchasing the property by the Central Government. The notice (Exh. 3) was issued on 21st April, 1995 fixing the date of appearance to be on or before 26th April, 1995. According to the provisions of S. 269UD, the limitation for making order under it was to expire on 30th April, 1995. According to the averments made in the petition and which have not been denied by the respondents, the notice was served on the petitioner on 28th April, 1995, that is to say two days after the date fixed for appearance in show cause notice Exh. C. The petitioner promptly submitted a reply dt. 28th April, 1995 on 29th April, 1995 raising objection as to the insufficiency of notice as well as on merit of the case for the purchase. However, the Authority did not accept the same and the petitioner, therefore, sent the reply by speed post. Respondent No. 2 has pointed out the late receipt of the notice and requested for another date for submitting the reply. However, the fact was this that the Appropriate Authority had already passed the order on 28th April, 1995 (Annexure M) which is under challenge in this petition.

(3.) THIS leaves the question whether the Appropriate Authority be left free now to proceed in the matter afresh or the chapter should come to a close. Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Shah, contends that looking to the time limit prescribed under the provision before which the order for purchase must come into existence, the matter cannot be sent back for getting over that difficulty. Learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, submits that the order being invalid for want of compliance of principles of natural justice, the authorities may be left free to proceed further in accordance with law, notwithstanding that the period for passing such an order has expired. For that necessary discretion vests in the Court.