KRISHNADAS VITHALDAS SANJANWALA Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a group of twenty-three writ petitions in which a common question of law arises for decision. These petitions challenge the declarations made by the State of Gujarat in exercise of the power conferred upon it by clause (f) of Explanation to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 2 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 (hereafter called the Act) in regard to certain lands belonging to petitioners. The lands with which the writ petitions are concerned are situated in three talukas of the State. Four of the writ petitions relate to lands situated in Pardi taluka nine relate to lands situated in Umbergaon taluka and the remaining ten relate to lands situated in Bulsar taluka. The land-holders in two writ petitions had filed statements under sec. 10 of the Act and their cases were decided under the provisions of the Act. In regard to the other land-holders no statements were filed by the land-holders under that section of the Act. This was not done by those land-holders on the ground that the lands possessed by them were all below the ceiling areas. Section 2(6) clause (f) of Explanation of the Act empowers the Government to express an opinion that grass land of the kind referred to in that Explanation is land tit for cultivation of rice and on the expression of such an opinion grass land would be of the category of rice land and the ceiling area correspondingly would change. In regard to some of the lands held by petitioners such opinions were expressed by the State Government on different dates ranging between 2nd December 1964 and 15 March 1965. By those declarations the Government expressed the opinion that the lands referred to in the declarations were fit for rice cultivation. On these declarations being made proceedings for determination of the surplus lands in the hands of twenty-one petitioners were started and the orders already passed in regard to the land-holders in the other two petitions were set aside by the revising authority and fresh proceedings were started against those two land-holders. All the landholders contested the proceedings urging that they were not holders of surplus lands. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal (hereafter called the Tribunal) held in all the aforesaid cases that petitioners herein were holders of surplus lands in regard to certain areas. This was done mainly on the basis that the grass lands which they held at the date of the commencement of the Act became rice lands in their hands on the issue of the aforesaid declarations of the Government that they were lit for rice cultivation. It is common ground that the orders that petitioners were holders of surplus lands were all based on the aforesaid declarations of the Government under clause (f) of Explanation to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 2 of the Act and that but for the latter declarations none of the petitioners would be holders of surplus lands or holders of such lands to the extent mentioned in the final orders passed by the Tribunal Against these orders land-holders preferred appeals to the Collector. Whilst these appeals were pending petitioners filed the present petitions. As already stated all these petitions are directed against the aforesaid declarations of the Government made under clause (f) of the Explanation to sec. 2(6) of the Act. Therefore the question which arises for decision in these twenty-three petitioners relates to the validity of the declarations made by the State Government.

(2.) Mr. Nanavati with Mr. B. J. Shelat and Mr. S. H. Sanjanwala appears in two of the petitions and Mr. B. J. Shelat appears with Mr. S. H. Sanjanwala in the rest of the petitions-all on behalf of petitioners. The petitions in which Mr. Nanavati appears were argued at length and Mr. B. J. Shelat adopted all the arguments of Mr. Nanavati in the other petitions.

(3.) It will be convenient at first to state the submissions which were made by Mr. Nanavati on the basis of which he prayed for the issuance of the writs prayed for. At the commencement of his arguments Mr. Nanavati formulated the following three submissions:- (i) The opinion formed by the State Government under clause (f) of Explanation to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 2 of the Act should have been formed before or on the appointed day that is the day on which the Act came into operation or at least before the expiry of the period of ninety days laid down in sec. 10 of the Act for submitting particulars by owners of lands and any opinion formed by the State Government after the aforesaid period or periods is totally ineffective. (ii) Before making the impugned declarations the State Government-the first respondent-has not applied its mind to determine for itself the question whether grass lands are or are not fit for cultivation of rice. and (iii) the provision contained in clause (f) of Explanation to sub-sec (6) of sec. 2 of the Act which leaves the State Government to determine subjectively an objective fact is ultra vires the power of the State Legislature and therefore void. We may at once state that in the course of the arguments the third submission was given up and two new versions alleged to be alterations of that submission were put forward but ultimately after the learned Advocate General had commenced his arguments even the changed versions of the third submission were finally given up by Mr. Nanavati. In the course of his arguments on the third submission Mr. Nanavati did not justify the third submission as formulated by him. Instead he formulated the following new submissions:- On a true construction of clause (f) of Explanation to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 2 of the Act power conferred on the State Government was in the nature of delegated legislation and as the scheme of the Act centres round the appointed day the power could only be exercised on the appointed day. After so formulating the third submission Mr. Nanavati went on to formulate the same over again in the following manner:- The provision contained in clause (f) of Explanation to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 2 of the Act being in the nature of a piece of delegated legislation the same can be upheld only if the Legislature lays down the legislative policy and that as the same was not done the provision was in law ineffective. When the learned Advocate-General commenced his arguments he started on the basis of the admission made by Mr. Nanavati in the above submissions that the power given to the State Government under clause (f) of Explanation to sec. 2(6) of the Act was in the nature of delegated legislation and he contended that on that admission he was entitled to argue that the power so conferred could be exercised by the State Government at any time and had to be given effect to by the authorities appointed under the Act as a piece of delegated legislation. The moment the learned Advocate-General adopted this line of argument Mr. Nanavati stood up and stated that he had formulated the last two altered submissions under a misapprehension and that he wished to withdraw the implication in the aforesaid altered submissions viz. that the provision was a piece of delegated legislation. As a result Mr. Nanavati conceded that he did not wish to pursue the last two altered submissions as they were based on the assumption that the aforesaid provision was a piece of delegated legislation. Under the circumstances the main third submission and the two alterations thereof do not arise at all for our consideration We may mention that Mr. Nanavati whilst arguing the second altered submission also had conceded that petitioners had not taken up that contention in their petitions and that as the law permits the State Government to prove by evidence aliunde that the Legislature had formulated a legislative policy the respondent would be prejudiced inasmuch as they would not have an opportunity to show that such a legislative policy was formulated and therefore on that ground also he did not pursue the second altered submission formulated by him. In view of the aforesaid course which the arguments of Mr. Nanavati took it is not necessary for us to consider the third submission or its two alterations any further. Therefore there are only two submissions as formulated above which require the decision of this Court.