STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. CITY TILES LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) As common question of law and facts arise in this group of appeals, they are disposed of by this common judgment and order. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal dated April 9, 2013 passed in Second Appeal No. 319 of 2012, by which, the learned Tribunal has allowed the said appeal and has set aside the order passed by the authority below passed on the show-cause notice issued by the officials of the Excise Department and consequently has set aside the demand raised as a result thereof by entering into the merits of the case though the appeal before the learned Tribunal was against the order passed by the first appellate authority dismissing the appeal not on merits but on non-deposit of amount of pre-deposit, the State has preferred present Tax Appeal No. 148 of 2015 to consider the following questions of law and mainly to consider the substantial question of law that whether the learned Tribunal has erred in deciding the appeal on merits despite the fact that first appellate authority dismissed the appeal for failure to deposit the pre-deposit:

(2.) Heard Ms. Vacha Desai, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the appellant-State and Shri Devan Parikh, learned senior advocate appearing with Shri Shail S Shah, learned advocate for the respective opponents- dealer- assessee.

(3.) The main grievance which is voiced in the present tax appeals is that despite the fact that respective appeals preferred before the learned Tribunal were against the order passed by the first appellate authority on pre-deposit and/or against the order passed by the first appellate authority dismissing the respective appeals solely on the ground of non-deposit of pre-deposit, the learned Tribunal instead of considering the legality and validity of the orders passed by the first appellate dismissing the appeals on nonpayment of the amount of pre-deposit had entered into the merits of the case and had decided the appeal before it as if the appeals before it were against the order passed by the first appellate authority on merits.