LAWS(GJH)-1994-8-20

KALPANABEN M SHAH Vs. NAVINCHANDRA JEEVANLAL ACHARYA

Decided On August 17, 1994
Kalpanaben M Shah Appellant
V/S
NAVINCHANDRA JEEVANLAL ACHARYA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners of this group of Applications are the original applicants in a group of eleven petitions before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Valsad at Navsari for compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,999/ -. It was the case of the applicants in all the petitions that they were travelling in a Matador towards Saputara and when they reached village Baj, all of a sudden, an ST bus came from the opposite direction driven by the original opponent No. 1 (respondent No. 1 herein) in an excessive speed, rashly and negligently and dashed with the Matador as a result of which the petitioners were seriously injured; and therefore, the claim for damages as prayed for in their respective petitions. The learned M. A. C. Tribunal by his common Judgment and award dismissed the petitions against which the present petitioners (original applicant) have preferred the respective appeals. Since the amount of compensation claimed was below Rs. 10,000/ - the appeals have been converted into the present group of Spl. Civil Applications. All these applications raise identical questions, arise from similar facts and from the same common judgment and award, hence, they are being conveniently disposed of by this common judgment.

(2.) Mr. N. A. Pandya, learned Advocate for the petitioners after having invited my attention to the impugned Judgment submitted that the Tribunal ought not to have dismissed the application of the petitioners when the Tribunal has held that the driver of the bus in question was rash and negligent. In the submission of Mr. Pandya, the Tribunal while disposing of the applications followed the summary procedure under Rule 311 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 considering them as cases of minor accidents, but the Tribunal rejected the applications of the petitioners mainly on the ground that the petitioners have not offered themselves for cross -examination even though the Tribunal has ordered to that effect. In the instant case, it so happened that all the petitioners have filed affidavits to substantiate their claim. The respondents gave application Exh. 94 seeking the cross -examination of the petitioners on 28 -8 -1989 whereupon the Tribunal passed an order directing the petitioners to offer themselves for cross -examination as sought for by all the respondents. However, the learned Advocate for the petitioners made an endorsement to the effect that it is not possible to produce the petitioners for cross -examination and thereafter by Exh. 95, the petitioners closed their evidence by giving Purshis. It appears that thereafter also the matter was heard and before the pronouncement of the judgment an application (Exh. 125) was given by the petitioners seeking permission to appear for cross -examination which also came to be heard and allowed. In spite of this, the petitioners did not turn up on the date fixed as well as on the next date, and thereafter the learned trial Judge passed the impugned order. Mr. Pandya submitted that in the summary procedure followed by the Tribunal, it is not necessary to strictly follow the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and as per the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gagubhai and Others v. Goswami Bhikhu Gangaram reported in AIR 1990 Guj. 5, the claim applications could have been decided on affidavits. The Division Bench of this Court in the said judgment has also laid down that: