(1.) Heard Mr. Rajesh Dave for the petitioner and Mrs. Vasavadatta A. Bhatt for the respondents. The petitioner was appointed as a driver under second respondent-Urban Land Tribunal by the order dated 10-11-1989. The condition No. 1 of appointment order states that the said appointment was only for one year on a probationary basis. These conditions are in Gujarati. The paragraph prior thereto, however, uses the English word "probation". The petitioner was given an extension for a period of six months by order dated 28-11-1989. The said letter also says that the petitioner's probationary period was being extended by further six months. The services of the petitioner were subsequently terminated before the expiry of the said period of six months by order dated 9-5-1990 stating therein that his services were not required. The said order of termination is challenged in this petition.
(2.) I have heard Mr. Dave in support of the petition who has made various submissions. Firstly, he has tried to contend that although the post on which the petitioner was appointed was not a permanent one, his appointment was on a temporary basis and not as a probation. He tried to derive the advantage from the Gujarati words "Taddan Hangami Dhorane" used prior to the words "probationary driver" in the paragraph prior to the conditions. The words "Taddan Hangami Dhorane" would mean "purely temporary basis". These words cannot enhance the status of the petitioner to that of temporary employee. The phrase of "purely temporary basis" used in the present order is only by way of emphasis. The condition No. 1 of the appointment order specifically states that the appointment of the petitioner was for one year on probationary basis ("Ajmayashi Dhorane"). The same phrase is used in the letter dated 28-11-1989 extending the probationary period. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was appointed on temprorary basis.
(3.) Based on this averment, Mr. Dave tried to contend that since he was in a temporary post, a necessary notice prior to termination was required to be given under Rule 33(1)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959, as applicable in Gujarat. Based further thereon he relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in the case of Sub-Div. Soil Conservation Officer v. M. M. Saiyed, reported in 1990 (1) GLR 495 to contend that since the requisite notice was not given, the termination of the petitioner was bad in law. However, since the appointment of the petitioner was not on a temporary basis, the ratio of the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.