KAVIRAJ RAMLAL CHATURBHUJ Vs. PRANT OFFICER DAHOD PRANT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution which in substance is one under Article 227 thereof the petitioners have challenged the order passed by the Prant Officer Dohad in Private Forest Acquisition Case No. 6 of 1974 and as confirmed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in TEN. A. A. 264 of 1976. By the impugned orders the petitioners claim for compensation for acquisition of trees situated in the private forest belonging to the petitioners which came to be acquired under the provisions of the Gujarat Private Forests (Acquisition) Act 1972 hereinafter referred to as the the Acquisition Act came to be rejected by both the aforesaid authorities.

(2.) In order to highlight the grievance of the petitioners a few relevant facts which emerge well established on the record of this case deserve to be noted at the outset. The petitioners were proprietary Jagirdars of village Taladara situated in Santrampur taluka of Panchmahals district. In this village are situated two pieces of lands bearing S. Nos. 40 and 146 over which there was heavy growth of trees and which survey numbers according to the petitioners constituted a private forest. The petitioners proprietary Jagir of village Taladara came to be abolished under the provisions of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas Jagir Abolition Act 1953 hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act. Under the provisions of the Abolition Act compensation was awarded to the petitioners for the Jagir properties which vested in respondent No. 2-State under sec. 8 of the Abolition Act. According to the petitioners the aforesaid two survey numbers of village Taladara on which was situated a heavy growth of trees did not vest in respondent No. 2 under the provisions of the Abolition Act as these survey numbers represented private forest land which did not vest in the second respondent under the provisions of the Abolition Act. It is the case of the petitioners that after coming into force of the Abolition Act the forest situated on survey numbers 40 and 146 remained in the private ownership of the petitioners. They dealt with the said forest as full owners thereof. As these forest lands did not vest in the State of Gujarat under the Abolition Act no compensation was paid to the petitioners for these forest lands. However the second respondent subsequently enacted the Acquisition Act whereunder such private forest vesting in the Private Owners came to be acquired and as per the Acquisition Act compensation was required to be paid to the private forest owners both for the forest lands as well as the trees. The petitioners therefore applied to the compensation officer acting under the Acquisition Act as per sec. 7 read with sec. 6 of the Acquisition Act. The first respondent herein was the competent authority before whom such application could be made. The first respondent by his order dated 3-3-1976 came to the conclusion that for private forest situated on survey numbers 40 and 146 of village Taladara compensation should be awarded for the forest land but not for trees standing thereon as according to the first respondent the petitioners had no right title or interest over these trees and consequently no compensation was awarded for the trees. The petitioners carried the matter in appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under sec. 12 of the Acquisition Act. The appeal came to be dismissed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that the petitioners claim for compensation for trees situated on survey numbers 40 and 146 could not be entertained under the provisions of the Acquisition Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manvinkurve v. Madhavsinghji A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 1747 popularly known as Waghachs case. The aforesaid decision of the Tribunal has been brought in challenge by the petitioners in the present proceedings as noted earlier.

(3.) Mr. J. D. Patel learned Advocate for the petitioners vehemently contended that the Tribunal had committed a patent error of law in taking the view that in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Waghachs case (supra) the petitioners were not entitled to be paid any compensation for acquisition of trees standing on S. Nos. 40 and 146 under the provisions of the Acquisition Act. He submitted that the aforesaid view was not only patently erroneous in law but was also contrary to the evidence on record which clearly shows that the lands in question were surveyed and settled prior to the appointed day viz. 1 subsequent to which possession of these survey numbers was taken from the petitioners by the officers of the Government as per sec. 4 of the Acquisition Act. He submitted that when possession of private forest land was taken from the petitioners it is obvious that the petitioners became entitled to be paid compensation for the private forest which vested in the second respondent pursuant to the Acquisition Act. That the very concept of possession presupposes the existing right of the petitioners in the acquired lands and the forest lands which were the subject matter of acquisition proceedings under the Acquisition Act did consist of not only the lands but also of trees which were standing on these lands and which formed private forest itself. He heavily leaned on the definition of the term private forest as enacted by sec. 2(f) of the Acquisition Act. He further submitted that the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Waghachs case (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case and hence the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction under sec. 12 of the Acquisition Act in not computing proper compensation payable to the petitioners for the trees standing on the concerned survey numbers.