MANILAL BHUKHANDAS CHEVLI Vs. INDUSTRIAL COURT GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner carries on the business of manufacturing art silk cloth in the name and style of United Textile Manufacturing Co. at Surat. Respondent No. 2 which is a representative union filed an application in the Third Labour Court at Ahmedabad against the petitioner inter alia for a declaration that he had committed an illegal change by changing the practice of assigning two looms per weaver to assigning three looms per weaver and thereby introducing rationlisation and prayed for the withdrawal of this change which he alleged was an illegal change. In his written statement the petitioner denied that there was any rationalisation as alleged and stated that no notice was required under the provisions of section 42(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 The petitioner also raised other contentions but it is not necessary for us to consider them as they are no longer relied upon by the petitioner. The Labour Court held that the petitioner had brought about an illegal change and granded the second respondents prayer. An appeal against that order was rejected by the Industrial Court which confirmed the decision of the Labour Court and gave four months time to the petitioner to withdraw the illegal change. It is against these orders that the petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of certiorari to quash and set aside the said orders.

(2.) The impugned orders were based upon Item 4 of Schedule II to the Act. As it stood originally the item was as follows:- Rationalisation or other efficiency systems of work. This item was however amended by a notification No. 1287/48 dated December 7 1953 and the amendment added the following words in that item namely whether by way of experiment or otherwise. The defence of the petitioner both in the Labour Court as also in the Industrial Court was that the change which was admittedly effected by him did not amount to rationalisation for the assignment of three looms to each worker instead of two looms as before was by way of an experiment only. The petitioner also challenged the power of the State Government to issue this notification and further challenged the validity of sec. 113 of the Act whereunder power to alter or amend Schedules I II and III or even to delete therefrom any matter was reserved to the State Government. The case of the petitioner thus was that the change effected by him would not amount to the reason that the State Government changed that item by the aforesaid notification. But since the provisions of sec. 113 did not validly confer power upon the State Government to effect any change or alteration in the said item his case would not fall either under that item or under sec. 42 or 46 of the Act. These contentions were rejected by the authorities below and as aforesaid the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging their orders.

(3.) On behalf of the petitioner the same contention has been raised before us namely that sec. 113 of the Act is ultra vires inasmuch as it empowers the State Government to make at any time any addition to or alteration in industrial matters specified in any of the three Schedules or even to delete any matter therefrom. The argument was that under this section the State Government can add at any time it chooses any industrial matter in Schedule II or delete any matter therefrom and thus make a change without notice which was not illegal illegal and that which was illegal legal. It was submitted that the State Legislature has not laid down any limit to such a power nor any condition upon which the executive can exercise this power nor has it laid down any principle or criteria defining as to what matters can be added or altered. The consequence of such an unbridled power would be that the executive can introduce any matter it likes and create new offences of a penal character. The contention therefore was that granting of such a power to the State Government under sec. 113 amounted to excessive delegation and surrender by the Legislature of its legislative power and that the section consequently was ultra vires.