LAWS(GJH)-1964-9-14

RAYMA JUSAB ALIMAMAD Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

Decided On September 14, 1964
RAYMA JUSAB ALIMAMAD Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant was convicted under sec. 218 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge against him was that being the Talati he had erased the signature on a previous receipt issued by the previous Talati and substituted his own signature on that receipt in order to show that the amount had been realy received by him and not by the previous Talati and in order to save the previous Talati from the charge of the misappropriation of the amount previously paid to him. To prove such a charge the prosecution must prove that the previous signature on the receipt had been erased by the accused and that in addition to doing so he had put his own signature after cancelling the previous signature. On this point there is no evidence whatsoever except the evidence of the Mamlatdar who has deposed as follows:-

(2.) It is surprising that evidence has been recorded in this manner. It is not for a witness to give his opinion unless he is an expert. It is wrong for the witness to say that the signature seems to have been erased or cancelled. It is for the Court to decide whether the signature seems to have been erased or cancelled. Evidence in the form it appears that etc. should not have been allowed by the learned Sessions Judge. This is not the manner of giving evidence in a Court. Witnesses must give evidence as to what is within their personal knowledge. When the expression it appears that.... is used opinion evidence is being given. Such evidence should have never been allowed unless it is the opinion of an expert or is otherwise admissible. It is surprising that the learned Sessions Judge has forgotten this elementary principle of taking evidence. The Mamlatdar has also deposed as follows:

(3.) The evidence that Circle Inspector Ramniklal reported to me that the accused had made erasures in a certain Pavti is absolutely irrelevant as being hearsay. In fact the Circle Inspector Ramniklal has made no mention of this fact in his evidence at Ex. 7. In fact even if he tried to make such a statement that should have been disallowed as hearsay. What a person finds as a result of investigation is absolutely shut out by sec. 60 of the Evidence Act as hearsay. All references to the report of the Circle Inspector and the result of his investigation are therefore absolutely irrelevant. It is the duty of the Court to disallow the evidence of such a type even if it is not objected to by either side. As the Privy Council has remarked in Lim Yam Hong & Co. v. Lam Choon & Co. A. I. R. 1928 P. C. 127 Judges should stop witnesses from giving hearsay evidence.