(1.) By this appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter to be referred to as, "the Act"), the appellant has challenged the order dated 12th March, 2014 made by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") whereby, the application made by the applicant seeking condonation of the delay caused in preferring the appeal has been turned down, and the stay application as well as the appeal have also been dismissed.
(2.) Mr. D.K. Trivedi, learned advocate for the appellant invited attention to the application for condonation of the delay made by the appellant before the Tribunal to submit that sufficient cause has been made out for condoning the delay of 189 days in preferring the appeal. It was submitted that the appellant had entered into a contract with M/s. Indian Rayon, Veraval for carrying out the work of electrical house wiring and industrial wiring in the plant site and colony area of M/s. Indian Rayon. Thus, essentially the appellant is engaged in doing labour work and was not aware of the intricacies of law. It was submitted that after receiving the order-in-appeal the appellant had contacted his Chartered Accountant who had told him that the Commissioner (Appeals) had directed the adjudicating authority to re-quantify the demand and advised him to wait for the re-quantification. He also informed the appellant that he would be required to first deposit the entire amount of demand and penalty and only then he would be allowed to prefer an appeal. He has also not advised him as regards the forum before which such appeal was required to be preferred. When the appellant realised that he was not being given proper guidance by the concerned Chartered Accountant he contacted some other advocate and filed the appeal before the Tribunal. However, in the process the appellant could not file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation and there was a delay of 189 days. It was submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the appellant being a layman and a semi-literate person relied upon the consultant for proper guidance, and was, therefore, not justified in not condoning the delay and dismissing the appeal. It was, accordingly, urged that the appeal does give rise to a substantial question of law and deserves to be allowed.
(3.) Opposing the appeal, Mr. H.C Buch, learned standing counsel for the respondent, submitting that the Tribunal, while rejecting the application for condonation of delay has duly considered the explanation advanced by the appellant and has not found the same to be satisfactory. Thus, it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal is in any manner improper or unjust so as to warrant interference. The appeal being devoid of merit, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.