KHACHAR GODADBHAI PITHUBHAI Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These petitions arising from operation of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 ('the Act' for short) challenge the orders declaring "bid" lands held by Girasdar to be surplus lands and the revisional orders confirming them. The challenge against such acquisition of large tracts of bid lands as surplus lands was mounted mainly on the twin grounds of the Act being not applicable to bid lands and the relevant provisions being ultra vires the Constitution. Since all the matters were argued together on these common grounds, they are disposed by this common judgment although the relevant facts of only Special Civil Application No.1290 of 1983 were canvassed and are considered as typical for the purpose of deciding the issues.

(2.) In order to appreciate the facts and contentions, reference to the relevant provisions and historical background of holding of the bid lands by Girasdars would be necessary. The petitioners are Girasdars recognized as such in the erstwhile State of Saurashtra when the Act to provide for certain land reforms in Saurashtra in the form of Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 was enacted with the avowed object, inter alia, of putting an end to girasdari system and extinguishment of their rights. "Land" for the purpose of that Act meant "any agricultural land, bid land, or cultivable waste". By section 4 of that Act, all girasdari lands were declared to be liable to payment of land revenue to the State. Besides improving the land revenue administration and regulating the relationship between Girasdars and their tenants, that Act provided for allotment of land to Girasdar for personal cultivation and, for that purpose, priority was required to be given to allotment of such of the bid lands or cultivable waste of the estate as the girasdar would wish to utilize for himself. The word "estate" was defined to mean land of whatever description or undivided share thereof held by a girasdar and it included uncultivable waste, whether such land was used for the purpose of agriculture or not. And, "bid land" was defined to mean such land as was used by a girasdar for grazing his cattle or for cutting grass for the use of his cattle.

(3.) In the facts of the present cases, the bid lands held by Girasdars were held to be "land" within the meaning and definition of section 2 (17) and, therefore, liable to acquisition upon being declared to be surplus land. It is the case of the petitioners that the holding of bid lands by girasdars had survived all the three land reform legislations, including the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 before its amendment in 1974. It was by the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Amendment Act, 1974 that the definition of "land" in section 2 (17) was substituted and bid lands held by Girasdars under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 and the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 were specifically included in the definition. It was submitted that even though such bid lands held by girasdars were included in the definition of "land", it cannot fall within the definition of "dry crop land" because only grass land which abounds in grass grown naturally and which is capable of being used for agricultural purpose can, by definition, be included in the "dry crop land". And, if the bid land held by the petitioners was not "dry crop land", it cannot fall in any of the classes of land as defined in section 2 (6) and, therefore, cannot be considered for the ceiling area prescribed under section 6 of the Act, according to the submission. Elaborating this argument, the learned counsel submitted that Girasdars were holding bid lands, which included cultivable waste and uncultivable waste, where grass did not naturally grow in abundance. Such rocky and stony lands cannot by any stretch be treated as agricultural land in respect of which restrictions on holding were envisaged by the Act. Thus, the attempt was to canvass that the bid lands held by Girasdars cannot be deemed or declared to be "surplus land" under the provisions of the Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL vs. BENOY KUMAR SAHAS ROY [AIR 1957 SC 768] was relied upon to submit that the mere fact that an activity has some connection with or is in some way dependent on land is not sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term and such extension of the term "agriculture" is unwarranted. The term "agriculture" cannot be dissociated from the primary significance thereof which is that of cultivation of the land and even though it can be extended both in regard to the process of agriculture and the products which are raised upon the land, there is no warrant at all for extending it to all activities which have relation to the land or are in any way connected with the land. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment in SHAMBUSING DHANSING JADHAVRAO v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [AIR 1981 Bombay 331] in which, in the context of Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, it was held that, if land was not used for agriculture, or was not capable of being used for agriculture, the land must be left out of calculation. It is also observed therein that if land is incapable of being used for agriculture, the mere circumstance of a future possibility that it can be brought under cultivation or its capability of being used at some distant future for agricultural purpose would be of no avail. Similarly, the judgment in SUBHASH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [ AIR 1981 Bombay 382] was cited in support of the submission that merely because some patches of grass grew here and there, it would be difficult to call the land to be not rocky and barren. "......The primary intention of the Act was to place a ceiling upon agricultural lands which can be held by a person and to distribute such excess lands and to acquire them through the State for distribution amongst the persons contemplated under the Act.......The definition, therefore, of the word "land" which includes land on which grass grows naturally must be so construed and interpreted as to mean that the bulk of the land and most of the land which comes under that description are such lands which can be used ultimately for agricultural purposes, and not lands where grass grows here and there but are otherwise entirely rocky and barren."