CHHAGANBHAI RAMABHAI Vs. REBABEN WD O CHHOTABHAI LAXMIDAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In our country which abounds in illiteracy and poverty on the part of its people, should an illiterate and poverty-stricken litigant be denied to knock the doors of justice simply because he could not approach the forum for the purpose within the prescribed period of limitation for want of funds? This question in the main has cropped up in this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India for challenging the correctness of the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad ('the Tribunal' for convenience) on 13th June 1986 in Revision Application No.TEN.B.A. 101 of 1984. By its impugned decision, the Tribunal rejected the revisional application of the petitioners as time-barred without examining the merits of the case.2. The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The petitioners moved the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Khambat ('the first authority' for convenience) with an application under Sec.70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ('the Act' for brief) for declaration of their status as the tenants of one parcel of land bearing Survey No. 322 Paiki admeasuring 5 acres 9 gunthas situated in village Vatadra taluka Khambat ('the disputed land' for convenience). It came to be registered as Tenancy Case (Vatadra) No. 14 of 1979. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his order passed on 14th July 1980 in the aforesaid proceedings, the first authority rejected it. The aggrieved petitioners carried the matter in appeal before the Deputy Collector at Petlad. Their appeal came to be registered as Tenancy Appeal No. 244 of 1980. By his order passed on 24th November 1980 in the aforesaid appeal, the Deputy Collector at Petlad dismissed it. The aggrieved petitioners thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal for questioning the correctness of the aforesaid order passed by the first authority as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector at Petlad. There was delay of some 4 1/2 months in prefering the revisional application before the Tribunal. It came to be registered as Revision Application No.TEN.B.A. 101 of 1984. It did not accompany the delay condonation application at the time of its institution. Later on the delay condonation application was also filed on 8th July 1985. It came to be registered as TEN.B.A. 899 of 1985 (3). Its copy is at Annexure A to this petition. It was also accompanied by the affidavit made by petitioner No. 1 herein. A copy of that affidavit is at Annexure B to this petition. By its decision rendered on 13th June 1986 in the aforesaid revisional application of the petitioners, the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure C to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the decision at Annexure C to this petition.

(2.) . Shri Patel for the petitioners has been quite critical of the approach and attitude of the Tribunal towards the application for condonation of the delay in prefering the main application. According to Shri Patel for the petitioners, the Tribunal ought to have made it liberal approach to the delay condonation application and ought to have condoned the delay in prefering the main revisional application on the facts and in the circumstances narrated by the present petitioners in their delay condonation application. As against this, Shri Nanavati for the respondents has urged that the Tribunal has very well acted within its jurisdiction and no error of law whatsoever has been made by it in its impugned decision at Annexure C to this petition. Shri Nanavati has further urged that the Tribunal has applied settled principles of law enunciated by certain well considered ruling and this Court need not interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) . This Court and the Supreme Court have time and again expressed the opinion that the approach of courts with respect to the delay condonation applications should be liberal and not technical. The land-mark ruling on the point is the one in the case of Karim Abdullah vs. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbahi Jam and others reported in (1975) 16 G.L.R. 835. I do not propose to burden this judgment of mine by extensively quoting therefrom. The sum and substance of the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Abdullah (supra) is that, unless the delay is occasioned by unexplained gross negligence on the part of the concerned party or is attributable to some ultierior motive, it should normally and ordinarily be condoned. It has been held that substantial justice lies in deciding the case on merits rather than rejecting it on technical considerations.