(1.) In these Special Civil Applications, petitioners, who are individuals, on the simple ground they jointly purchased or acquired vacant land, have been treated as a single unk for the purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act 23 of 1976 (hereinafter refeued to as "The Act"). When the petitioners challenged this action on the pan of the authorities by preferring the Special Civil Applications, pleading that they are owners holding definite earmarked shares and hence, they must be held to be tenants-in-common and for the purpose of the Act, their definite specified shares in the vacant land, alone could be taken note of, the learned single Judge, even though there is a pronouncement of another learned single Judge of this Court, expressed in Smt. Savitaben Wlo. Shri Shantilal C. Shroff and others vs. State of Gujarat & others, 1991 (1) G.L.H. 186, deemed fit to refer these Special Civil Applications for consideration to a Bench. The main reason, as we could see from the order of reference, which weighed with the learned single Judge is that in the pronouncements of the Apex Court, as well as the pronouncements of the High Court of Bombay, though dealing with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, a different note has been struck.
(2.) The petitioners jointly purchased or acquired the vacant lands in question. Each petitioner's share is defined and specified and in that view, the petitioners can be said to be only "tenants-in-common". However, on a theory that the petitioners have not got their shares separated by metes and bounds, the authorities proceeded to deal with the petitioners in each case as one unit. The Act defines a 'person' under Section 2 (i) thereof as follows:
(3.) The definition of 'person' under Section 2 (1) of the Act, is an inclusive one. It includes "an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not". That could only mean that an association or body of individuals as an entity and as an unit could also hold vacant land. In such a case, the individuals, who could go to constitute association or body, do not hold and it is only the association or body, which holds. It is the nature and scope of holding that is decisive on this point If individuals own definite and specified shares, though acquired under or through a single source or transaction or dealing, then, they may not come within the ambit of 'association' or 'body of individuals' holding the land. When individuals hold specified shares, it is only those specified shares with reference to respective individuals that could be the subject matter of assessment and consideration under the Act. Lack of division amongst such individuals by metes and bounds is of no legal consequence at all. In that view, such individuals, being "tenant-in-common", cannot be treated as the 'association' or 'body' as such, holding the vacant land. That there could be a holding by an association or body of individuals as a separate entity has been taken note of and provision therefore has also been made in the Act, is clear when we refer to sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, which runs as follows: