APURVABHAI DIATRAI SHAH Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The disputed land originally belonged to respondent No. 2 herein. It appears that he became its deemed purchaser under the Act. He applied to the Deputy Collector of Viramgam Prant at Ahmedabad for permission under Section 43 of the Act for sale of the disputed land in favour of the present petitioners. By his order passed on 10th June 1981, the Deputy Collector granted such permission. Its copy is at Annexure to this petition. It appears that, about 2 years thereafter, respondent No. 1 invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the tribunal for questioning the correctness of the order at Annexure-A to this petition. It came to be registered as Revisional Application No. TEN B. A. 1634 of 1983. Respondent No. 1 and the present petitioners were shown as the opponents therein. On behalf of the petitioners, the revisional proceedings were resisted inter alia by-pressing into service the bar of limitation contained in Section 97 of the Act. By its decision rendered on 23rd July 1985 in the aforesaid revisional application, the tribunal accepted it and set aside the order at Annexure A to this petition. A copy of its decision is at Annexure B to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the decision at Annexure B to this petition.

(2.) It is an admitted position on record that the Revisional Application in question was made by respondent No. 1 about 2 years after the date of the order at Annexure A to this petition. Section 79 of the Act prescribes the period of limitation to be 60 days inter alia for preferring an application for revision against the order passed by the Collector. The order at Annexure A is admittedly under Section 43 of the Act and it is said to have been passed by the Deputy Collector in exercise of his powers as Collector. His order could have been challenged in revision within 60 days from its date in view of Section 79 of the Act. It has also been provided therein that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 would apply inter alia for filing of such application for condonation of the delay in preferring the revisional application before the tribunal was made by or on behalf of respondent No. 1.

(3.) On the basis of the aforesaid factual data, Shri Vakil for the petitioners has urged before me that the tribunal could not have accepted the revisional application as it was hopelessly time-barred. Shri Vakil for the petitioners has urged that even a null or void order is also required to be set aside within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. In absence of any delay condonation application, runs the submission of Shri Vakil for the petitioners, the tribunal ought not to have entertained and accepted the Revisional Application filed by and on behalf of respondent No. 1 herein. As against this, Shri Patel for respondent No. 1 has urged that no law of limitation would be applicable to a null and void order. According to Shri Patel for respondent No. 1 a null and void order has no existence in the eyes of law and it has to be treated as such whether it is set aside or not.