KHARAGHODA GRAM PANCHAYAT Vs. KUMAR BIJENDRASINH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in Special Civil Application No.2599 of 1980 is the appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal. The respondent in the Special Civil Application is the respondent in this Letters Patent Appeal. The appellant is a Gram Panchayat. It came to this Court preferring the Special Civil Application impugning the order of the respondent dated 21/26 July 1980 Annexure-G. That is an order made under section 135-D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 The broad implications of the impugned order are 14 205 acres of land out of 22 768 acres of land which were previously held to be within the limits of the appellant-Gram Panchayat were held to fall within the limits of village Odu and 8568 acres of land were hold to be desert land and on earlier order of the respondent was cancelled. The learned Single Judge who dealt with the Special Civil Application took the view that the dispute relates to title to the land in question and this dispute requires resolution by filing a suit. Thus without entering into the merits the learned Single Judge rejected the Special Civil Application. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge.

(2.) Mr. D. D. Vyas learned counsel for the appellant would place in the forefront the aspect of violation of the principles of natural justice in making the impugned order and would submit that in such a contingency; it would not be proper to drive the appellant to resort to any ordinary civil remedy and the respondent must be directed by this court to adhere to the principles of natural justice. We find that on the facts disclosed before us this plea of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves countenance. The specific case of the appellant as put forth in the Special Civil Application is that an enquiry was held by Mr. A. K. Pradhan who was the then Collector of Surendranagar and the enquiry was adjourned from time to time and there was an assurance by Mr. A.K. Pradhan that summons would be issued and further hearing date would be informed and all these assurances were thrown to winds and the impugned order had come to be passed as a bolt from the blue. With regard to the stand expressed by the appellant in the Special Civil Application as briefly traced above the affidavit-in-reply of the respondent has denied that there was any assurance by then Collector Mr. A.K. Pradhan that summons would be issued. But with reference to hearing being afforded to the appellant the following averments were found in the affidavit-in-reply and they are portent enough and they do support the case of the appellant.

(3.) Thus it has been conceded in the affidavit-in-reply that there was an assurance by the then Collector Mr. A.K. Pradhan that the appellant would be heard after going through the records of the office of the District Inspector of Land Records and before the opportunity of being heard could be afforded to the appellant Mr. A.K. Pradhan was transferred and the subsequent incumbent in the office of the Collector Surendranagar had chosen not to respect and adhere to the assurance extended by Mr. A.K. Pradhan the then Collector and he has chosen only to go through the records and the notes and pass the impugned order. Certainly what was assured to the appellant by the previous Collector cannot be so easily forgotten and given a go-by by the successor-in-office. What was assured by the one incumbent in the office must be respected by the subsequent principles of natural justice stood violated when the impugned order had come to be passed. When there was an assurance by the previous incumbent in the office of the Collector that the appellant will be heard in the matter certainly it instilled an expectation in the mind of the appellant of having an audience to make out his case in the matter. We can even say that the assurance brought forth a confidence to the appellant that it would have an opportunity of impressing upon the respondent very many facets of afforded on fulfilment of the assurance extended. The expectation was abrogated and the pronouncing that in matters like this there should always be a personal hearing afforded to the parties. We have no occasion to make any such pronouncement categorically. What we are concerned with is only the facts of the cast and what transpired out of them. When it is said that the principles of natural justice are not a rigid code and inflexible rules it could meant that the application of the principles of natural justice will depend upon the facts of each case. In the present cast we have no ambiguity in our mind that the principles of natural justice did stand violated.