BALUBHAI Vs. MANIBEN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Court has time and again emphasised that the approach of subordinate Courts to delay condonation applications should be liberal. What would apply to subordinate Courts would equally be applicable to the subordinate Tribunals amenable to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The landmarked judgment of this Court on the point is the ruling in the case of Karim Abdulla vs. Bai Hoorbai reported in (1975) 16 Gujarat Law Reporter at page 835. The principles enunciated therein have come to be reiterated even by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court at page 1353. The approach of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad while disposing the delay condonation application as reflected in its decision rendered on 13th June 1986 in Restoration Application No. TEN.D.A. 36 of 1986 is quite distressing and disturbing as the view taken is contrary to the law pronounced by this Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra ) as confirmed by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra).

(2.) The facts giving rising to this petition move in a narrow compass. The predecessor-in-title of the present petitioners invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad by means of his Revision Application No.TEN. B.A. 1033 of 1981. At the time of its hearing, unfortunately for him his learned Advocate did not remain present; nor did he send any application for adjournment. By its decision rendered on 15th September 1983 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad rejected it for default of appearance of the revisional applicant as well as his Advocate. Its copy is at Annexure-B to this petition. It appears that the present petitioners came to know of the decision at Annexure-B to this petition some time around 1st March 1986 and thereupon they filed one Restoration Application for setting aside the decision at Annexure-B to this petition and restoration of the default dismissed revisional application to file. It came to be registered as Restoration Application No.TEN.D.A. 36 of 1986. It appears that the petitioners also made one application for condonation of delay in preferring the aforesaid restoration application. Shri Gandhi for the petitioners states at the Bar that he has a copy of the delay condonation application made in the Restoration Application and on reading it Shri Gandhi for the petitioners states at the Bar that the ground given for seeking condonation of the delay was to the effect that the predecessor-in-title of the present petitioners breathed his last some time on 15th October 1984 and about 1 Vi years prior to his death he was seriously ill and practically bedridden. By its decision rendered on 13th June 1986 in Restoration Application No.TEN.D.A 36 of 1986, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad rejected it on the ground that it was hopelessly time-barred. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the aforesaid decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad at Annexure-A to this petition.

(3.) It is true that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra) had not seen the light of the day in the law journals when the Tribunal decided the fate of the Restoration Application by its decision at Annexure-A to this petition. The ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra) was very much in existence at that time. It has been clearly held therein that, unless the application for condonation of delay is made with some ulterior motive or that there is gross unexplained delay in making it, an application for condonation of delay should ordinarily be accepted and the delay in preferring the main matter should normally be condoned. This court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra) has given cogent and convincing reasons for taking that view. It is unfortunate for the petitioners that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad in its impugned decision at Annexure-A to this petition has not taken note of the aforesaid binding ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra). Its approach, to say the least, is too technical to be upheld. It appears that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad has not properly appreciated the aforesaid contents of the delay application read out to me by Shri Gandhi for the petitioners from its copy in his possession. The facts averred in that delay condonation application should have moved the Tribunal to decide the fate of the Restoration Application on merits rather than on such technicality. It appears that the other side did not contend before the Tribunal to the effect that the delay in preferring the Restoration Application was deliberate and with some ulterior motive. It was presumably equally note the case of the other side that the gross delay in preferring the Restoration Application remained unexplained. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the approach of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad with respect to the delay condonation application can be said to be highly erroneous and perverse. Such an approach is contrary to the principles in that regard settled by this Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Karim Abdulla (supra) and reiterated by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra)