(1.) This Court, in the case of Bai Amina v. State of Gujarat, (1981) XXII GLR 1186, considered the nature and extent of the privilege available to the detaining authority, under Sec. 8(2) of the National Security Act not to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose. While this petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench, a contention was raised on behalf of the respondent-authorities that the law laid down by this Court in Bai Amina's case was not good law inasmuch as it is inconsistent with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Balkrishna Kashinath Khopkar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, (1956) 58 BLR 614, which decision was a binding decision. The Division Bench was of the view that the point raised by the respondent-authorities is of great public importance and is 'required to be threshed out once and for all by a larger Bench'. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the point raised, the Division Bench raised the following two questions and referred the same to a Larger Bench :
(2.) What is contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that the Division Bench in Bai Amina's case has proceeded on the premises that there is a conflict of two different public interests when such privilege is claimed. One public interest is an interest of the detenu to whom the grounds are required to be furnished with sufficient details so as to enable him to make an effective representation against his detention. The other public interest consists of the need to withhold some materials or particulars the disclosure of which would expose the source of the material to grave danger to his life or property in view of the fact that the person against whom he has given information is of a dangerous character. What is submitted is that this premise is basically wrong inasmuch as the interest of the detenu can be regarded as private interest only and not public interest. It is further submitted that it is settled law that as between public interest and private interest, private interest must give way and for that reason what is held by this Court in Bai Amina's case cannot be regarded as good law. For appreciating the two contentions raised by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is necessary to carefully examine the said two decisions and to understand what has been laid down therein. The decisions can be said to be in conflict with each other, if the ratio of the decisions is inconsistent. Merely because some observations made in the decision appear to be inconsistent with some observations made in the other decision, it cannot be said that the ratio of the two decisions is in conflict with each other. Before it can be said that the two decisions are inconsistent, it will be necessary to appreciate the context in which such observations have been made and whether they form the ratio of the decisions.
(3.) In Bai Amina's case, this Court, while interpreting Sec. 8(2) of the National Security Act has held that while withholding the disclosure of materials, facts and particulars to the detenu on the ground that it would harm the public interest, another public interest, which requires the disclosure of all relevant particulars and materials on which the order of detention is based, with a view to affording an effective opportunity of representation to the detenu against the order of detention, must be borne in mind, and that the delicate balance between the two must be maintained by the detaining authority. This Court, after examining the right conferred by clause (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution and the limitations placed upon it by clause (6) of that Article, held that since sub-sees. (1) and (2) of Sec. 8 of the National Security Act substantially reproduce the provisions of clauses (5) and (6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, what has been laid down in the context of the said constitutional provisions would apply proprio vigore to the obligation imposed and duty cast upon the detaining authority under the said statutory provisions. This Court has further held that it is only when public interest likely to be subserved by non-disclosure outweighs or overrides the public interest intended to be served by disclosure that the relevant information must be withheld. This Court has also held that this privilege can be claimed by the detaining authority only if he is satisfied, after proper application of mind to each relevant aspect, that it is against public interest to make the disclosure. It is further held that when the privilege of withholding facts and particulars is exercised, the detenu cannot be heard to say that in the absence of such facts and particulars, he is not in a position to make an effective representation, save and except when the exercise of privilege is challenged as malafide. While interpreting the provisions this Court further pointed out that the Courts rigidly insist that preventive detention procedure should be fair and strictly observed. The detaining authorities should exercise the privileges sparingly and "in those cases only where there is full satisfaction". While elaborating what can be regarded as "full satisfaction", this Court made the following observations :