LAWS(GJH)-1973-4-2

COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX Vs. PHIROZSHA PESTANJI

Decided On April 06, 1973
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX Appellant
V/S
Phirozsha Pestanji Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference raises a short question of construction of section 21, sub -section (1), of the Wealth -tax Act, 1957. The reference arises out of assessment years 1962 -63 and 1963 -64, corresponding valuation dates being March 31, 1962, and March 31, 1963. The assessee was, at all material times, the sole executor and trustee under the will of one Pestanji Faramji Contractor (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased'). The deceased died on August 16, 1941, having duly made and published his last will dated June 4, 1941. We are concerned with only three clauses of the will and we may, therefore, confine our attention to them. The deceased directed under clause 13 of the will that a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 joint stock companies or Government securities and the net income from such investments should be paid to Smt. Alamay, wife of his son, Manekshah, 'for the benefit of Manekshah till he survives' and Manekshah should be entitled to utilize the amount of such income 'according to his sweet will'. Clause 13 of the will also made a provision for disposal of the corpus after the death of Manekshah. Likewise, by clause 14 of the will, the deceased directed that a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 should be set apart from his estate and invested in shares of banks or joint stock companies or Government securities and the net income from such investment should be paid to his another son, Nadirshah, during his lifetime. The deceased also gave further directions regarding the disposal of the corpus after the death of Nadirshah. Clause 15 of the will provided that so far as these two amounts of Rs. 5 lakhs each were concerned, 'the trustees should invest them in shares or securities and get them transferred in their names as my trustees' and such shares or securities, after being transferred in the names of the trustees 'should be lodged with any sound bank at Bombay or in the Bank of Baroda at Baroda, with such an arrangement with the bank that the bank should directly pay the interest to Nadirshah and to Smt. Alamay on behalf of Manekshah'. The assessee who was the eldest son and Jarbai who was the wife of the deceased were appointed executors and trustees of the will but Jarbai died on April 6, 1951, with the result that the assessee remained the sole executor and trustee of the will. Pursuant to the directions contained in the will, Government securities of the face value Rs. 4,61,000 were acquired by the executors and trustees for the benefit of each of the two beneficiaries, namely, Manekshah and Nadirshah. On the relevant valuation dates, Government securities of the face value of Rs. 4,61,000, which were meant for the benefit of Manekshah, stood in the joint names of Manekshah and his wife and they were deposited with the bank and interest was being collected by the bank and paid over directly by the bank of Manekshah and his wife. Similarly, Government securities of the face value of Rs. 4,61,000 which were meant for the benefit of Nadirshah stood in the joint names of Nadirshah, the assessee, and one other person and they were lodged with the bank and the bank was collecting interest and paying it over directly to Nadirshah. On these facts, the question arose in the assessments of the assessee as trustee of the will of the deceased for the assessment years 1962 -63 and 1963 -64, whether the value of the life interest of Manekshah and Nadirshah in the Government securities which were set apart for their respective benefit was liable to be included in the next wealth of the assessee for the purpose of assessment to wealth -tax. The Wealth -tax Officer took the view that section 21, sub -section (1), was applicable and under that provision the assessee in his capacity as trustee of the will of the deceased was liable to be assessed to wealth -tax in respect of the value of life interest of Manekshah and Nadirshah in the Government securities meant for their respective benefit. The assessee challenged the inclusion of these amounts in appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the appeals were unsuccessful. The assessee thereupon carried the matter in further appeal to the Tribunal. The assessee contended before the Tribunal that the Government securities of the face value of Rs. 4,61,000 which were meant for the benefit of Manekshah stood in the joint names of Manekshah and his wife while the Government securities of the face value of Rs. 4,61,000 which were meant for the benefit of Nadirshah stood in the joint names of Nadirshah, the assessee, and one other person, and since neither lot of Government securities stood in the name of the assessee and the assessee had no control or dominion over either of these two lots of Government securities, they could not be said to beheld by the assessee within the meaning of section 21, sub -section (1), and no wealth -tax could be levied on them in the hands of the assessee by relying on that provision. This contention found favour with the Tribunal and on the view that the Government securities did not stand in the name of the assessee and the assessee had no control or dominion over them and they could not, therefore, be said to be held by the assessee for the benefit of any person but they were in fact held directly by the beneficiaries themselves, the Tribunal deleted the inclusion of the value of the life interest of Manekshah and Nadirshah in the Government securities from the net wealth of the assessee. The Commissioner thereupon applied for a reference but the application was rejected by the Tribunal and the Commissioner was, therefore, constrained to make an application to this court for requiring the Tribunal to state a case on certain questions of law which according to the Commissioner arose out of the order of the Tribunal. This application was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court and the following three questions of law were directed to be referred to the High Court :

(2.) PURSUANT to the requisition made by us, the Tribunal has submitted the above three questions which have been referred for our opinion turns on the true interpretation of sub -section (1) of section 21, which reads as follows :

(3.) NOW it must be remembered that the meaning of a word is not constant. It varies according to the context in which it is used. No less eminent authority than Mr. Justice Holmes has pointed out that a word is the skin of a living thought. What is the meaning of a word must, therefore, depend on the context and the setting in which it is used and the purpose it is intended to achieve. It is possible that, in one context a word may mean one thing and, in another, it may men something different. That is so with the word 'held' and we have, therefore, to see what, in the context in which it is used in section 21, sub -section (1), this word means. Now one thing is clear, namely, that the word 'held' when used in reference to receiver or manager cannot include the concept of vesting, for it is clear law that the property does not vest in a receiver or manager, the receiver or manager only manages the property on behalf of others and, therefore, the word 'held' in that context must mean factual management.B ut the question before us does not arise in relation to receiver or amanager. We have to consider what is the meaning of the word 'held' when used in reference to a trustee. The answer to this question would be - self -evident if we reproduce the relevant words of sub -section (1) of section 21.