(1.) IN these six references the facts of each case and the questions referred to us for our opinion are identical and we, therefore, intend to dispose of these references by this common judgment.
(2.) IN these references, though the relevant assessment years are different they are all within the period from the assessment years 1960 -61 to 1963 -64. It appears that in the assessment of the respective respondents -assessees under the Wealth -tax Act for the respective assessment years, a claim was made on behalf of the assessees that the valuation of certain pieces of their land should not be included in the computation of the net wealth, they being agricultural land. That claim having been rejected by the Wealth -tax Officer, the assessees went in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 23 of the Wealth -tax Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the claim and allowed the appeal. The Wealth -tax Officer, therefore, took the matters in further appeal before the Tribunal where in the course of hearing of the appeals, a contention was raised on behalf of the revenue, though not urged in the grounds of the memo of appeals, that as no notice of the date of effective hearing of the appeals was given to the Wealth -tax Officer, the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was bad in law. This contention found favour with the Tribunal, as it was of the opinion that the Wealth -tax Officer being a party to the proceedings, should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard by service of the notice of the date of effective hearing, since such right is implicit in the scheme of the Wealth -tax Act or in any case on principles of natural justice and fair play because the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was an independent judicial officer who is not supposed to assume the role of a Wealth -tax Officer and the counsel of the department. The Tribunal having regard to the proceedings before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that the proceedings -sheet contains an order of giving notice to the Wealth -tax Officer of prior dates, there was neither any such order with regard to the effective date of hearing, nor was there any document to show that the Wealth -tax Officer had knowledge of the effective date of hearing. The Tribunal, therefore, accepted the appeals of the Wealth -tax Officer and remanded the matters to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for disposing them a fresh after service of notice to the Wealth -tax Officer. At the instance of the assessees, therefore, the following question has been referred to us for our opinion;
(3.) IN Commissioner of Income -tax v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria, the court was concerned with the question, whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is entitled to travel outside the record, that is, returns made by the assessee or the assessment order of the Income -tax Officer, with a view to find out new sources of income and whether the power of enhancement under section 31(3) of the Indian Income -tax Act, 1922, is restricted to the sources of income which had been the subject -matter of consideration by the Income -tax Officer from the point of view of taxable income. In the context of this question, the Supreme Court, after approving the decision of the Bombay High Court in Narrondas Manordas v. Commissioner of Income -tax, regarding the width and scope of the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31(3), observed as under :