K.S. NIRMALKUMARSINHJI Vs. SAURASHTRA STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, who was accused in the case, was tried along with five others, for offences of dacoity and grievous hurt under Sections 395 and 326, Penal Code, and was convicted by the Additional Sessions judge, Gondal, and on appeal the conviction of the petitioner and accused 2, 3 and 6 was confirmed, while accused 4 and 5 were acquitted by this Court. All the accused were also charged under Section 19(e), Arms Act, but en this charge they were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge himself. The petitioner now wants a certificate that his case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

(2.) THE facts necessary for appreciating the points urged in support of this application briefly stated are that accused 1 and the remaining accused and the deceased dacoit Devayat had, on 9.1.1952, planned a dacoity to be committed at Rib, a village about 13 to 14 miles from Rajkot, and that in pursuance thereof they came in two batches to Rajkot the next day, accused 1 and some others travelling in his own station wagon, referred to as the 'khatari' and after staying at Rajkot till about 6.30 p.m. of January 10, all of them started in the khatari and reached Rib village at about 7.15 p.m. and there committed the dacoity. While at Rajkot, accused 1 had gone to the Bombay Garage and had enquired from the Sales Manager, one Mr. Jayantilal, about the price of a Chevrolet car and was given a price list, Ex. 20, which paper had flown from the khatari on its return journey from Rib to Bhavnagar. Accused 1 was not identified by any of the victims of the dacoity and the evidence against him was circumstantial. It is not necessary to relate all that circumstantial evidence here, and such part of it as is material will be referred to while dealing with the points made by Mr. Bhatt in the course of the arguments.

(3.) THE point as to what is a substantial question of law was dealt with by the Bombay High Court in -Kaikhushroo Pirojsha v. C.P. Syndicate Ltd. AIR 1949 Bom 134 (E), and it has also been considered by this High Court in -Nanji Maneklal v. Kismatlal Nanji Civil Misc. Appln. No. 65 of 1952 (Sau) (F). Both these were civil matters and while the Bombay case fell under Section 110, C.P.C. the case before us was covered by Article 133 and Sections 109(c) and 110, C.P.C. Agreeing with the view in -Kaikhushroo Pirojsha's case (E) we have held that if there is a well established principle of law and that principle of law is applied to the facts of the case that would not be a substantial question of law. Where the question of law was not well settled, or where there was some doubt as to the principles of law involved, it might be regarded as a substantial question of law. This test or standard is equally true of criminal matters.