LAWS(GJH)-2003-7-14

NAGJIBHAI J DESAI Vs. DIRECTOR OF MUNICIPALITY

Decided On July 02, 2003
NAGJIBHAI J.DESAI Appellant
V/S
DIRECTOR OF MUNICIPALITY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has challenged the decision of the respondent no.1-Director of Municipalities, relaxing the eligibility criteria pursuant to the proposal dated 5.11.90, by which the President of the Municipality had requested the Director to consider the case of one Laxmanbhai Mochi, for relaxation of the eligibility criteria of educational qualification for his appointment to the post of Tax Superintendent. The petition was filed on 10th February, 1991 and status-quo, which was granted, has remained operative, as a result of which, admittedly, no further action was taken pursuant to the impugned order dated 8th February, 1991, which is now placed on record by the respondents alongwith other papers.

(2.) According to the petitioner, he was working as Octroi Clerk in the respondent-Municipality. He had put in 22 years of service, and belonged to Economically and Socially Backward Class community. He was having M.Com. Degree and had passed Local Self-Government Diploma Examination. He had also passed his 1st LL.B. examination. According to him, his service record was good.

(3.) From the above facts, it is clear that the attempt of the President of the Municipality to get Laxmanbhai appointed as Tax Superintendent had miserably failed, because, Laxmanbhai was not at all qualified as per the criteria of educational qualification adopted for the post. However, it appears that the President did not pay any heed to the stand taken up by the Collector and the Director, and instead of proceeding to fill up the post, as per the recruitment criteria, wrote a letter dated 5.11.90, a copy of which is placed on record, to the Director referring to Special Civil Application No. 2876 of 1984, which was filed by Laxmanbhai, in which, after narrating the fact that the earlier request of the Municipality to relax the educational qualification of Laxmanbhai was turned down, he again, in detail, pleaded the case of Laxmanbhai, praying in para-8 of the letter that the educational qualification may be relaxed in the case of Laxmanbhai. It was also stated that Laxmanbhai had agreed to withdraw the petition filed by him and a letter in that regard was forwarded along with his communication. Admittedly, the Municipality had not passed any resolution for amending the initial requirement of graduate with preference to Law graduate, which was the only educational requirement laid down under the order sanctioning the post. However, the respondent no. 1, acting on the said letter addressed by the President pleading the case of Laxmanbhai, without there being any resolution of the Municipality, and ignoring the earlier stand taken up by the Director and the Collector, proceeded to make the impugned order dated 8.2.91, in which he referred to the letter, dated 5.11.90 as a proposal of the Municipality and pursuant to that letter, prescribed the revised educational qualifications namely of graduate with priority to Law graduate with an alternative of S.S.C. and L.S.G.D. with seven years' experience. From the chronology of events, it is abundantly clear that the President of the Municipality was bent upon to anyhow get Laxmanbhai, who was not at all qualified, appointed to the post of Tax Superintendent, and to ignore the claim of the petitioner, who possessed the qualification higher than the requisite qualification, and ought to have been considered for the post which was advertised pursuant to which he had applied. It is unfortunate that the Director of Municipality did not see through the game, and though there was no resolution made by the Municipality, he acted on a simple letter of the President, not realising that it was the Municipality which alone was empowered under Section 271(d) & (g) to make rules, not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules or orders of the State Government, for determining the staff, officers and servants to be employed by the Municipality and their powers and duties, and for determining, subject to the limitations imposed by Sections 47 and 50, inter alia, mode and conditions of appointing any officer and servant.