HIRABEN JIVANBHAI CHAUDHARI Vs. R C RAVAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India raise common questions of law based on almost common facts, and therefore, they are decided by this common judgment.

(2.) The relevant facts giving rise to present petitions shortly stated are as under : (i) Both the petitioners applied to District Primary Education Committee, Mehsana District, for appointment to the post of Primary Teacher. (ii) The petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 8496 of 1991 in her application stated that in the year 1984 she had obtained 711 marks out of 1000 marks in P. T. C. examination. She also stated in such an application that as per the procedure marks obtained in the subjects of Samuh Jivan, Buniyadi Udyog Yearly Work and Sahayak Udyog Yearly Work marks being 56, 66 and 33 respectively were required to be deducted and after such deduction she had obtained 560 marks. Such application was signed by the petitioner herself and is filled in by her in her own hand-writing. (iii) The petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 8497 of 1991 had also applied for appointment as Primary Teacher to District Education Committee, Mehsana and in her application she has stated that she had obtained 712 marks out of 1000 marks in P. T. C. examination and as per the procedure marks obtained by her in the subjects of Samuha Jivan, Buniyadi Udyog Yearly Work and Sahayak Udyog Yearly Work were to be deducted and after deducting such marks she has mentioned 558 marks as obtained by her in her own application in her own hand-writing and said application was signed by her. (iv) The said applications submitted by the petitioners were checked by the Checking Officer and the petitioners were on the strength of details supplied in the application forms were called for interview. (v) At the time of interview, both the petitioners have produced marks-sheets in which they have shown the total marks obtained by them as 711 out of 1000 and 712 out of 1000 respectively. The petitioners, at that time, did not produce original marks-sheets, but only produced the copy of marks-sheets. (vi) The percentage of marks obtained by the applicants were worked out on the basis of the information supplied by the applicants in their application forms and accordingly the petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 8496 of 1991 had obtained 597 marks while the petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 8497 of 1991 had obtained-percentage of marks. The select-list included the candidates obtaining marks higher than 56.1%, and therefore, the names of both the petitioners came to be included in the select-list since as per the information supplied by them they had obtained marks more than 56.1%. The office of the District Primary Education Officer has, however, insisted for production of original marks-sheets and when the original marks-sheets of the two petitioners were received, it was found that the petitioner of Spl. C. A. No. 8496 of 1991 had obtained 643 marks out of 1000, i.e., 51.98% as per the procedure after deducting the marks of 3 subjects and therefore, her name was not required to be included in the select-list. The petitioner in Spl. C. A. No. 8497 of 1991 had obtained 654 marks out of 1000, i.e., 54.42% as per the procedure of counting after deducting marks of three subjects, her name also was not liable to be included in the select-list. (vii) On inclusion of their names in the select-list as and when the vacancies occurred the petitioners were appointed to the post of Primary Teacher vide orders of appointment, dated 15/11/1986. (viii) On coming to know about the fact that each petitioner has obtained appointment to the post of Primary Teacher by stating facts which were not true to their knowledge and the marks stated in the application when compared to the original marks-sheets of P. T. C. examination where not correct and hence by practising fraud upon the District Education Committee they have obtained appointments, the D.E.O., Mehsana the respondent No. 1 herein vide order, dated 22/11/1991 terminated the services of the petitioners removing each petitioner from the post of Primary Teacher with immediate effect. (ix) These orders of removing the petitioners from service or terminating their services on the ground that they had obtained orders of appointment by fraud are under challenge in these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) Mr. K. G. Vakharia, learned Counsel for petitioners has submitted that the appointment to the post of Primary Teacher in schools run by the District Education Committee of Mehsana District Panchayat is an appointment in Panchayat Services and appointment in Panchayat Services is an appointment to the post in State Government Service. He submitted that for the purpose of appointment to the said post of Primary Teacher and for all purposes thereafter the appointee is governed by the Statutory Rules framed by the State Government under the provisions of Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961. The State of Gujarat, in exercise of powers conferred upon it by Sec. 305 of the said Act, framed rules known as 'Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, and these Rules hold the field and provide the procedure to be followed for imposing any penalty, major or minor, on a Panchayat servant. The petitioners were serving in the Panchayat since last five years, and therefore, if their services were to be terminated or they were to be removed from service, the procedure prescribed by the said service Rules was required to be followed. He, very vehemently, submitted that the petitioners having been lawfully appointed after following the procedure for such appointment by the authority, the petitioners have acquired status and their services cannot be straight-away terminated by order of termination simplicitor without following the procedure prescribed by the Statutory Rules of issuing notice to show cause, holding enquiry and affording a reasonable opportunity to defend to the petitioners, and thereafter, passing appropriate order of penalty. Since no such procedure worth the name was followed and since no opportunity to defend was afforded to the petitioners, the impugned orders were non-est and still-born orders and were required to be voided. In his submission, such an order terminating the services of the petitioners has adverse effects on the petitioners and such orders could not have been passed in blatant disregard of elementary rules of natural justice, and therefore, also the orders were null and void and were liable to be quashed and set aside.