KESHAVLAL M RAO Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) All the three Special Civil Application can be disposed of by a common order. Though various prayers are raised, the moot question that arises for consideration as per the pleas put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is as to whether the for a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent to recover the dues of the Petitioners as arrears of land revenue. petitioners could claim the status of Working Journalists and as such newspaper employees within the meaning of the Working Journalists And Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 45 of 1955, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The status claimed by the petitioners is being disputed by the contesting respondents. The endeavour on the part of Mr. H. A. Raichura, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the machinery under Sec. 17(2) of the Act must be set in motion even to decide this question. Section 17 as it stands today as a whole reads as follows :

(2.) So far as regards Sec. 17(1) is concerned, its working will come into play only when there is no dispute of any nature either with regard to the status claimed by the person as the newspaper employee or the quantum of the amount claimed as due by him from the employer. The condition precedent for invocation of Sec. 17(1) is a prior determination by a competent authority or forum as to the amount due to the newspaper employee from his employer and that too under the Act. It is only after the amount due to the newspaper employee from his employer under the Act stands determined, without any disputation over it, the stage will be set for recovery as per Sec. 17(1). Though Sec. 17(1) speaks about the State Government or the specified authority being satisfied as to "any amount is so due", the enquiry in this behalf could not be at a summary level and for a limited purpose to find out as to whether the amount already determined continues to be due or has been discharged fully or partially. Within the scop ze of Sec. 17(1) determination as such of the amount due, would not fall. Section 17(2) of the Act in contrast by the very opening set of expressions, namely "If any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to a newspaper employee from his employer", sets down the process for determination of the amount due. That could only be on the hypothesis that there is no dispute with reference to the right of the person to claim the dues as newspaper employee and the corresponding liability of the person arrayed as employer. In other words, there should not be any dispute with reference to the employer-employee relationship under the Act. The dispute could relate only to the amount due under the Act, which calls for a determination of the same. The determination could only be of the quantum of the amount due and not of the right to claim the amount. In that contingency, a power is conferred upon the State Government to refer the question to the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for a decision on that question and there afterwards as per Sec. 17(3) any amount found due by the Labour Court as per its decision has got to be recovered in the manner provided by Sec. 17(1). These are plain implications, deducible from a bare reading of Sec. 17.

(3.) Section 17 to a very great extent by verbalism and by implications stands in pan materia with Sec. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is comparable with Sec. 17(1) of the Act; and Sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is comparable with Sec. 17(2) of the Act. The scope of Sec. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has come up for consideration by pronouncements not only at the level of the High Courts but also at the level of the Apex Court of the land. They are incisive and they have, without any ambiguity characterised the machinery under Sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as one relatable to execution stage and not at the adjudicatory level over the right to relief claimed by applicant and denied by the opponent. They have held that investigation into and determination of any dispute regarding the applicant's right to relief and the corresponding liability of the opponent will be outside the scope of the said provision. The set of expression found in Sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is "If any question arises as to the amount of money due", from the employer to the workman. As already noted, the set of expressions used in Sec. 17(2) of the Act is "If any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to a newspaper employee from his employer". Under Sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the specified Labour Court decides that question. Under Sec. 17(2) of the Act, the question gets referred to the Labour Court for its decision over it. The similar features between the two provisions are very portent and on the basic factor that the provisions are in pari materia, there is every warrant for applying the ratio of the judicial pronouncements delineating the scope of Sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to delineate the scope of Sec. 17(2) of the Act. So done, we have to hold that the determination of the extent of the liability, with a view to facilitate recovery under Sec. 17(1) of the Act, alone will fall within the scope of Sec. 17(2) of the Act. Any question or dispute over entitlement arising on a claim for right to it, and a denial of it will be beyond the scope of a decision under Sec. 17(2) of the Act. There ought to be a pre-determination or settlement of that right, on the basis of which alone the question should arise as to the amount due,