STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. KISHANLAL JAGANATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The right of speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1360. Does the concept of speedy trial mean disposal of Criminal cases without giving an opportunity to the prosecution to bring the guilt home to the accused ? In the name of speedy trial for the accused, should the Courts suffer from such disposal mania as would occasion dispensation with, instead of dispensation of, justice ? This is what appears to have happened in the case represented by this appeal. The judgment and order of acquittal, rather the order of acquittal, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) of Court No. 3 at Surat on 1 3/04/1983 in Summary Case No. 2084 of 1983 is under challenge in this appeal preferred by the State of Gujarat after obtaining the necessary leave for the purpose from this Court on 17/01/1985.

(2.) The facts giving rise to this appeal are not many and not much in dispute. The respondents including the deceased respondent were chargesheeted for the offences punishable under Secs. 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (the 'Act' for brief). It transpires from the record that the charge-sheet was submitted to the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) of Court No. 3 at Surat on 4/03/1983. It was registered as Summary Case No. 2084 of 1983. The proceedings show that the plea of the accused was recorded on that very day after supply of copies of police papers to them. No accused pleaded guilty to the charge. The case was thereupon set down for recording of the prosecution evidence on 2 3/03/1983. The proceedings further show that on that day the prosecution witnesses were not present and the case was thereupon adjourned to 30th March, 1983. It appears that the prosecution witnesses did not remain present on that day either. The case was thereupon adjourned to 1 3/04/1983. It appears that no prosecution witness was kept present on that day. The prosecution agency appears not to have made any attempt to seek the help of the Court to summon its witnesses or any of them even by using a coercive process. It appears that such lethargy on the part of the prosecution agency enraged the learned trial Magistrate. By his order passed on 13/04/1983, the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) of Court No. 3 at Surat thereupon acquitted the accused of the charge levelled against them. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal before this Court after obtaining the necessary leave for the purpose on 17/01/1985.

(3.) The impugned order of acquittal cannot be sustained in law for a moment in view of the two rulings of this Court in the ease of State of Gujarat v. Lalit Mohan, reported in [1989 (2)] XXX (2) GLR 952 and in the case of State of Gujarat v. Gulamnabi alias Fakir Mohmad and Anr. reported in [1990 (1)] XXXI (1) GLR 60. In its ruling in the case of Lalit Mohan (supra), this Court has certainly emphasised that the purpose of criminal justice is to punish the offender and not merely disposal of cases and unwarranted acquittals of the accused. This Court has further held therein that under Sec. 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the 'Cr.P.C.' for brief) the Court has a coercive power to compel the attendance of witnesses. In its ruling in the case of Gulamnabi alias Fakir Mohmad (supra) this Court has deprecated in clear terms the approach of the Court in lightly disposing of criminal cases and acquitting accused. It has been emphasised therein that Courts must do real justice. In para 10 thereof at page 66 this Court has emphasised that the Court should always act and attempt to do justice even if the prosecution was lethargic in keeping present and examining prosecution witnesses on the fixed date before the Court.