MOTILAL MADHAVLAL CHAUHAN Vs. PADMABEN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment rendered by Ahmedabad City Civil Court in H. M. P. No. 43 of 1980 by which the marriage between the parties was ordered to be dissolved on 9-10-1980. It appears that there was marriage between the parties which was celebrated according to Hindu rites on 5-5-1975. Thereafter the appellant had filed Hindu Marriage Petition No- 103 of 1977 for obtaining decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty and the respondent had filed Hindu Marriage Petition no. 186 of 1977 for obtaining relief of restitution of conjugal rights against the appellant. Both the petitions were heard together and they were disposed of by one judgment. The petition of the appellant was dismissed by the court while respondents petition for restitution of conjugal rights was granted. This judgment was delivered on 31-3-1978.

(2.) The appellant filed First Appeal No. 552 of 1978 and the respondent filed cross-objections in that appeal. Ultimately the appeal and the cross-objections were withdrawn on 30-1-1980. Thereafter petition no. 43 of 1980 was filed by the respondent under the provisions contained in sec. 13(1A) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The main objections which were raised by the appellant in the trial court were that the petition was premature inasmuch as one year had not elapsed considering the date of withdrawal of the appeal and the cross-objections which was 30 while the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed on 4 The second ground was that there was a legal impediment created by sec. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore also the petition was not maintainable. The learned City Civil Judge did not agree with the contentions raised and therefore passed an order by which the marriage between the parties was ordered to be dissolved. That order is now being challenged by filing this appeal

(3.) We have heard the learned advocate Shri Memon who appeared on behalf of the appellant at great length. His first submission was that one year should be considered from the date on which the proceedings came to an end in the High Court i. e. 3(1-1-1980).