STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. THAKORBHAI VALLABHBHAI NAIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Letters Patent Appeal raises a short question as to the constitutional validity of prescription of different scales of pay for Assistant Lecturers who are holders of Second Class Degree with or without experience and Assistant Lecturers who are Second Class diploma holders with three years teaching and/or professional experience. The question arises in relation to Assistant Lecturers in different branches of Engineering employed in various Government Polytechnics in the State of Gujarat. The recruitment of these Assistant Lecturers is to be made by nomination and the qualifications for their recruitment are laid down in the Recruitment Rules made by the State Government. These Rules are administrative rules without any force of law but it is common ground between the parties that they have been consistently observed in making recruitment of Assistant Lecturers. Rule 1 of these Rules which provides for recruitment of Assistant Lecturers reads as follows :

(2.) The question is whether fixation of different pay scales for Assistant Lecturers who are degree holders and Assistant Lecturers who are diploma holders is discriminatory and hence violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. Now what is the true scope and ambit of Article 16 is well settled and it is not necessary to embark upon a discussion of the various authorities bearing on the subject. Article 16 assures equality of opportunity to all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. It represents an instance of application of the doctrine of equality which in its general formulation is to be found in Article 14 It gives effect to the concept of equality in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The expression matters relating to employment in Article 16 has received wide and liberal construction and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in General Manage Southern Rly. v. Rangachari A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36 it includes all matters in relation to employment both prior and subsequent to the employment which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment. This expression would therefore include not only matters relating to employment but also mattress relating to salary and periodical increments therein terms as to Leave as to gratuity as to pension and as to the age of superannuation. Article 16 requires that there should be equality of opportunity in regard to all these matters and a fortiori therefore the concept of equality must apply also in the matter of fixation of pay scales. But as has been said often while dealing with the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 the doctrine of equality does not require that all shall be treated alike irrespective of the differences amongst them. Article 14 does not enjoin the State to ignore differences between persons or things for the purpose of legislation. What it forbids is class legislation or in other words legislation which would treat differently those who are similarly situate. It does not forbid reasonable classification of persons or things for the purpose of legislation. When any statutory provision or rule is assailed on the ground that it violates Article 14 its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision. In other words there must be some rational nexus between the basis of the classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. Now as we have pointed out above Article 16 is only an incident of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14. Articles 14 and 16 as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Mysore P. Narasinga Rao A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 349 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. Article 16 must also therefore be construed in the same manner as Article 14 and it must be held that there is no denial of equality of opportunity embodied Article 16 if a classification of employees is made by the State which satisfies the two tests to which we have just referred. The State is not prohibited by Article 16 from making a reasonable classification of employees provided the classification is based on intelligible differentia which has relation or nexus with the object of the statutory provision or rule Now here a classification of Assistant Lecturers is made by the State into two groups one group consisting of Assistant Lecturers who are degree holders and the other group consisting of Assistant Lecturers who are experienced diploma holders and a higher pay scale is provided for Assistant Lecturers belonging to the former while a lower pay scale is provided for Assistant Lecturers belonging to the latter group. The question is whether this classification made by the State violates the rule of equality of opportunity embodied in Article 16. To answer the question we must ask ourselves whether Assistant Lecturers who are experienced diploma holders can be said to be similarly situate with Assistant Lecturers who are degree holders so that differentiation between them in the matter of fixation of pay scales would be irrational and unjustified by any considerations relevant to the object of fixation of pay scales or to put it briefly the classification of Assistant Lecturers into two groups for the purpose of fixation of pay scales can be said to be based on intelligible differentia having rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by fixation of pay scales.

(3.) While considering this question it is necessary to bear in mind the Nature of the post in relation to which the question arises for consideration. The post with which we are concerned is the post of Assistant Lecturer in Government Polytechnics in the State of Gujarat. Now there can be no doubt that a holder of a second class degree in the respective branch of Engineering would be better equipped and fitted to discharge the functions and duties of the post of Assistant Lecturer than a holder of a mere diploma in the respective branch of Engineering even if he has three years teaching and/or professional experience. The possession of a second class degree would definitely indicate higher intellectual and mental caliber of the holder and he would be a better equipped and more efficient Assistant Lecturer than a person who has merely obtained a diploma. Of course when we say this we do not for a moment wish to suggest that a holder of a diploma can in no case be superior to a holder of a second class degree. There may be exceptional cases where a diploma holder may be more capable and possessed of a higher caliber than a second class degree holder but such cases would be rare and the State cannot while making a rule dealing with broad categories be expected to provide for all exceptional cases. Or else as pointed out by me in a judgment given on 30th January 1969 in Special Civil Application No. 670 of 1966 the rule may become so overloaded with qualifications and exceptions that it may tumble down of its own weight. It must be remembered that no classification can be logically complete or accord with a pattern of plumb line precision .. Life is not capable of being divided into water tight divisions or categories and it is not possible to force the teeming multiplicity and variety of human activity into a procrustean bed of symmetrical rules. Absolute precision and complete symmetry are unattainable.....The classification which is sought to be challenged has therefore to be considered substantially and qualitatively and not superficially. When the impugned legislative or executive action indicates a policy and brings within its operation those who are similarly situated and it appears that the policy is a result of specific difficulties and the end to which it is directed is not objectionable on the ground that there is arbitrary or hostile discrimination the Court would not overthrow it simply because it leaves out of account exceptional cases and does not make special provision for them resulting in some inequality of treatment in those cases. The constitutional validity of a statutory provision or rule cannot be judged by reference to exceptional cases. The State can make a classification only on broad and general lines for the purposes of achieving a specific end and the classification cannot be condemned as arbitrary or irrational merely because some exceptional cases may not fit into the broad categories made by the State. So long as the basis on which the classification is made is directed to achieve a specific end and is supportable on a genuine reason and does not amount to naked discrimination some inequality which may result in the application of the rule should be regarded as merely incidental and not looked upon as unreasonable discrimination. Here the Assistant Lecturers are divided into two broad categories namely degree holders and experienced diploma holders and the reason on which the classification is based is that broadly speaking in the generality of cases a holder of a second class degree in any branch of engineering would be superior in training and equipment and possessed of a higher intellectual and mental caliber than a mere holder of a diploma even though possessing three years teaching and/or professional experience: the former would by and large be more efficient and better equipped to discharge the functions and duties of the post of an Assistant Lecturer than the latter.