AGRICULTURE PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, DEODAR Vs. DIRECTOR, AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND RURAL FINANCE, GUJARAT STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These intra-court appeals lay challenge to the order dtd. 4/5/2022 where-under, the learned Single Judge by the said order has stayed the execution, operation and implementation of the orders dtd. 11/4/2022 and 2/3/2022 (Letters Patent Appeal 879 of 2022) passed by the first respondent (Annexure- A).

(2.) We have heard the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the records. The learned Single Judge having taken note of the fact that first respondent while passing the impugned orders dtd. 11/4/2022 and 2/3/2022 had taken note of the fact that there was an order dtd. 15/2/22 which swayed in the mind of second respondent to pass said order and same having not been brought to notice of petitioner it came to be held that impugned orders suffer from violation of principles of natural justice. In the instant case, undisputedly, before passing the orders, namely while exercising the power under Sec. 14 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") the authority had issued notice to the writ applicants and, heard the matter and reserved it for orders. However, subsequently, an order came to be passed on 15/2/2022 by the authority exercising the power under Sec. 27A of the Act whereby, the application of the petitioners for grant of license came to be rejected. Taking note of the said subsequent event, impugned order dtd. 11/4/2022 and 2/3/2022 came to be passed. The order passed by the competent authority in exercise of power under Sec. 27A of the Act is an appealable order under Sec. 27A (7) of the Act and undisputedly writ applicants have filed appeals against said orders though belatedly which is accompanied by an application filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of such delay. Be that as it may. The authority exercising the power under Sec. 14 of the Act who was required to determine as to whether the petitioners cease to hold the office under sub-sec. (1) on account of the purported disqualification, under sub-clause (1) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 14 of the Act, had taken note of a subsequent event namely rejection of application for grant of license in favour of the writ applicants to pass the impugned order of disqualification against the writ applicants. This subsequent event having taken place after the matter was heard and reserved for orders and writ applicants having not been notified of the subsequent order dtd. 15/2/2022 which has been referred to under the impugned order dtd. 11/4/2022, it cannot be gainsaid by the first respondent that petitioners had an opportunity to explain the efficacy of order dtd. 11/2/2022 or to raise any other contentions before the first respondent. In absence of opportunity being extended to petitioner impugned order cannot be sustained.

(3.) Hence, we are of the considered view that the impugned orders dtd. 11/4/2022 and 2/3/2022 are liable to be set aside. Consequently, we proceed to pass the following