(1.) This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred with a prayer to quash and set aside the Award dated 10.04.2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot ("the Tribunal" for short) in Reference (I.T.) No.121 of 2004.
(2.) The petitioner is the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that the respondent workman was working as a Writer in the Bhachau Depot. When the inspection of the Booking department took place from 02.09.1998 upto 06.10.1998, the respondent did not co-operate with the Inquiry Officer and for the alleged insubordination, a charge-sheet was issued to her. The respondent gave a reply to the charge-sheet. However, the petitioner was not satisfied with the same and an inquiry was conducted against her, which resulted in the imposition of a penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect. The respondent preferred a First Appeal, which came to be rejected. The Second Appellate Authority reduced the punishment to stoppage of one increment with future effect. The respondent raised an Industrial Dispute, wherein the legality and validity of the departmental proceedings was not challenged but only the findings of the Inquiry Officer were assailed. By the impugned Award dated 10.04.2012, the Tribunal has set aside the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect as well as the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court, by filing the present petition.
(3.) Mr. Hardik C. Rawal, learned advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that the terms of Reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the Act" for short) were whether the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect imposed upon the respondent is liable to be quashed and set aside, or not. It is further submitted that the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect was reduced by the Second Appellate Authority, to stoppage of one increment with future effect. In fact, the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect no longer existed as it had already been modified by the Second Appellate Authority. Further, the terms of Reference were only regarding the legality and validity of the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect and not regarding the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. The Tribunal could not have gone beyond the terms of Reference by quashing the penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect, imposed by the Second Appellate Authority, without there being any terms of Reference regarding the same. It is contended that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside not only the penalty of stoppage of two increments that was within the terms of Reference, but also the penalty of stoppage of one increment, which was not part of the terms of Reference. It is, therefore, submitted that as the Tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of reference while passing the impugned Award, the same be quashed and set aside.