PATEL DOLABHAI PANABHAI Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY preferring this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 26.07.1993, passed by the Deputy Collector, Palanpur, and the order dated 05.03.2001 (17.03.2001), passed by the Joint Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, whereby the revision application against the aforesaid order of the Deputy Collector has been rejected.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case, as emerging from the record are to the following effect: Land bearing Survey No.45 admeasuring 12 Acres and 05 Gunthas situated at Village and Taluka: Dhanera, District: Banaskantha, was granted to Bhil Damra Duda, the father of respondents Nos.4 and 5, as Inami land, till such time as he continued in the service of the State. It appears that thereafter, Bhil Damra Duda was paid for services rendered, therefore, the Inami land was forfeited to the State and re-granted to him as new tenure land, on permanent basis. It appears that the name of petitioner No.1 was mutated in the revenue record as cultivator of the land in question. Mutation Entry No.655 dated 27.06.1998, was mutated in the revenue record to this effect. The land in question came under the restrictions of Section 73AA of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 (-the Code- for short). According to the petitioners, the land was converted into old tenure land for agricultural purposes by order dated 26.03.1980. On 10.02.1986, the Mamlatdar, Dhanera, passed an order holding the petitioners to be tenants in respect of the land in question and the Purchase Price was also determined by the aforesaid order. Proceedings for breach of Section 73AA of the Code came to be initiated by the Deputy Collector, Himmatnagar, and ultimately, the impugned order dated 26.07.1993 came to be passed, whereby the transfer of the land in favour of the petitioners as tenants was held to be in breach of Section 73AA of the Code, and the land was ordered to be returned back to the original owner. In the year 1997, the petitioners, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Deputy Collector, preferred a revision application against the said order, which came to be rejected by order dated 05.03.2001 (17.03.2001) passed by the Joint Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. In the above background, the petitioners have preferred the present petition.

(3.) THE first aspect that emerges from the record is the enormous delay in filing the petition. THE petitioners have impugned the order dated 26.07.1993 of the Deputy Collector and the order dated 05.03.2001 (17.03.2001) of the Joint Secretary (Appeals), confirming the aforesaid order of the Deputy Collector. THE Deputy Collector, in his order has directed the land to be returned to the original owner, forthwith, which order has been confirmed by the Joint Secretary (Appeals), on 05.03.2001 (17.03.2001). Eleven years have passed after the order of the Joint Secretary (Appeals). By now, the impugned orders may have been implemented. Having accepted the impugned orders for such a long period of time, being aware of the legal implications of the same, the petitioners have filed the present petition, after eleven years from the passing of the order of the Joint Secretary (Appeals). Not only that, a contention has been raised that the initiation of proceedings by the Deputy Collector is bad, as there is a delay of seven years, from the date of mutation of the names of the petitioners in the revenue record. If the petitioners rely upon the aspect of delay in challenging the initiation of proceedings against them, the same legal principles would be applicable to them as well. THE petitioners would have to explain the delay caused in filing the present petition, by showing sufficient cause. In Paragraph-5 of the petition, it has been averred that the petitioners are illiterate persons and were not aware about the further course of action and filed the present petition after a `well-wisher' apprised them of the further course of action. Such averment cannot be termed as a reasonable explanation for the delay. Nor it can be said on the strength of such averment that the petitioners have shown sufficient cause for the delay. In this context, it would be fruitful to advert to certain judicial pronouncements. In Maganlal V.Lodhiya v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Ors. (supra), this Court held that a petition was liable to be dismissed as the petitioner could not offer any explanation for the delay of four years. In Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. M.Prabhakar And Others reported in (2011)5 SCC 607, it has been held by the Supreme Court as under: