BHAILALBHAI TRIKAMBHAI Vs. KANTILAL DEVCHAND SHAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision application under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the original judgment-debtor against the judgment and order of the learned District Judge, Broach, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1985 confirming the order of the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Valia, District Broach, over-ruling the objections of the judgment-debtor regarding the executability of a consent decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 8 of 1971 arises from a long-drawn litigation between the parties. The following are the relevant facts.

(2.) The applicant Bhailalbhai Trikambhai had been occupying the property as a tenant. After serving the requisite statutory notice the opponents filed Regular Civil Suit No. 8 of 1971 against the applicant on 6-2-1971 for recovering possession of the suit premises on the ground of arrears of rent from 1-9-1967 to 1-4-1968 and also for recovering arrears of rent as well as mesne profits upto 30-12-1970. After about 5 years, the parties arrived at a compromise and submitted consent terms Exh. 83. We will advert to these consent terms in details in the course of appreciating the submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant, but shortly stated, the applicant-defendant admitted that he had been in arrears of rent, which he had agreed to deposit on or before 29-4-1977. It was further agreed that a decree for handing over possession of the suit premises on 1-5-1977 was required to be passed in view of the fact that the tenancy of the defendant had been terminated. At the same time a concession was stipulated in this agreement to the effect that if the amount of arrears was deposited on or before 29-4-1977, the plaintiff would not execute the decree and would continue the defendant as a new tenant. The parties were present in the Court, compromise was read over to them, and on their admitting the same, the learned Civil Judge was satisfied about the admissions made by the parties in this compromise and passed an order for drawing a decree in terms of compromise.

(3.) Thereafter the applicant-defendant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 156 of 1976 for setting aside the aforesaid decree on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation and coercion. This suit was dismissed on 31-7-1981, and Regular Civil Appeal No. 86 of 1981 filed by him also came to be dismissed by the learned District Judge, Broach, on 6-3-1984. The applicant's Second Appeal No. 129 of 1984 also was dismissed by the High Court at the admission stage on 6-7-1984. During this entire period the applicant continued to be in possession of the suit premises by virtue of the interim relief obtained by him.