MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MAFATLAL Industries Limited, petitioner No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioner'), imported 525 M.Ts. of 'Mono Ethylene Glycol' in March, 1990. The consignment arrived at Kandla Port in a vessel named 'm.v. BOW FALCON'. South India Corporation (Agencies) Limited, shipping agent of the vessel, filed a declaration on 12 -3 -1990 that the vessel was expected to arrive to Kandla on 15 -3 -1990. On 13 -3 -1990, the Agent also submitted to the Assistant Collector an Import Manifest. An application for Entry Inwards was also given on that day. As the vessel did not arrive on 15 -3 -1990, as expected, a fresh declaration was filed, mentioning therein that the vessel was expected to arrive at Kandla Port on 17 -3 -1990. On 16 -3 -1990, the petitioner filed a bill of entry for home consumption in respect of the said goods. The vessel actually arrived on 17 -3 -1990 and berthed at Inner Anchorage of 19 -3 -1990 and an Arrival Report to that effect was given to the Customs House, at Kandla. Necessary declaration and other required documents were also filed and a request was made to the Assistant Collector of Customs to depute an Officer of Customs on that day, to complete the arrival boarding formalities. All the boarding formalities were over on 19th March, 1990. However, in view of the public notice, dated 20 -2 -1990, issued by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Rajkot, the concerned Customs Officer did not himself grant the entry inwards, but made an endorsement that it will be granted by the Assistant Collector. Moreover, because of the public notice, the Shipping Agent was required to approach the Traffic Department of the Kandla Port Trust for obtaining a certificate to the effect that the vessel was ready for discharging the cargo. The Department did not grant such certificate on 19 -3 -1990 and instead, granted the same only on 20 -3 -1990.

(2.) IT is the petitioner's case that, it was because of the public notice that the Master of the vessel approached the Assistant Collector of Customs on 20 -3 -1990, with a Certificate of Readiness as regards the vessel's readiness to unload the cargo, duly confirmed by the Traffic Department of the Kandla Port Trust. Thereafter, the Assistant Collector granted entry inwards to the said vessel. As the entry inwards was granted on 20 -3 -1990 and not on 13 -3 -1990, the petitioner became liable to pay customs duty on the said imported goods at the rate of 105% + 45% + 15%, which became effective from 20 -3 -1990. If the entry inwards had been granted on 19 -3 -1990, the petitioners would have been required to pay duty at the rate of 45% + 45% + 15%. It is the petitioner's case that the public notice issued by the Collector was clearly beyond his authority, inasmuch as he had no power to issue such public notice and the notice is also ultra vires Section 31 of the Customs Act. As paid public notice was, thus, illegal and as the vessel was otherwise scheduled to discharge the cargo on 19 -3 -1990, the petitioners really became liable to pay duty, at the rate prevalent on 19 -3 -1990 and the action of the respondents in levying duty at the higher rate prevalent on 20 -3 -1990 is also illegal. The petitioners, therefore, want this Court to quash said public notice and direct the Assistant Collector of Customs, Kandla to pass an order, granting entry inwards to the said vessel as on 19 -3 -1990 and assess the petitioners' goods brought by the said vessel at the rate of 45% + 45% + 15%, which was in force on 19 -3 -1990.

(3.) WHAT is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that granting of entry inwards is a statutory function to be performed by the Customs Officer and statutory consequence as regards the rate of duty follows therefrom. It is not only statutory but quasi -judicial in nature inasmuch as his decision not to grant entry inwards when required may lead to adverse consequences. He further submitted that discretion of a quasi -judicial authority cannot be fettered by administrative instructions. The direction which the Collector had given, was not by way of supplementing the statutory provisions, but it added to the statutory conditions, subject to which entry inwards could be granted and thus interfered with the restricted the discretion of the Customs Officer. In the alternative, he submitted that as granting of entry inwards is a statutory function, it was not open to the Collector, in exercise of his administrative powers, to impose conditions not contemplated by the Act and which had the effect of disturbing the statutory consequence. He submitted that under Section 151A of the Customs Act, 1962, only the Board is empowered to issue such orders, instructions an directions to the Officers of the Customs as it may deem fit for the purpose of uniformity in the classification of goods or with respect to the levy of duty thereon. No such power is conferred upon the Collector and, therefore, the public notice issued by him must be regarded as without any authority of law.