UNION OF INDIA Vs. DHARAMSI F ZALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application is directed against the order passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court, Rajkot, on 30th January 1991, under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, inter alia , directing that Rs. 1,48,114/ - by way of pay with increment, D.A., house rent and bonus for the period during 19th February 1983 and 30th October 1990 should be paid to the applicant therein, namely Shri Dharamshi F. Zala, who is the respondent in this application. It may be noted here that the said respondent Shri Zala was a train clerk and his service was terminated in a disciplinary proceeding. He challenged the order of termination of his service before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the order of termination, directing his reinstatement in service, with all back wages. As the back wages and other benefits of service pursuant to the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal have not been paid to Shri Zala, he made an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the appropriate Labour Court for quantifying the monetary compensation to be paid to him and, as aforesaid, the Labour Court, Rajkot disposed of the said application, inter alia , directing to make payment of the amount stated hereinbefore. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court in entertaining the said application under Section 33C(2) has been sought to be challenged in the instant application and the learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended before us that since the order was passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, an application by way of contempt should have been made before that authority for executing the judgment and no application under Section 33C(2) could have been made before the Labour Court. Our attention has been drawn to the provisions of Section 20 and Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. It appears that Section 27 of the Act only envisages that the order passed by the Tribunal should be enforced in the same manner in which the order passed by the other authority from whose order challenge could be made before the Central Administrative Tribunal, could have been executed. The learned Counsel, however, has failed to show to us any provision by which any forum has been prescribed wherein the order by the departmental authority can be executed. The learned Counsel has also contended that as the decision made under Section 27 by the Central Administrative Tribunal cannot be challenged in any court except in the Supreme Court, such decision cannot also be executed in any other forum and execution of the order can only be made by the Central Administrative Tribunal itself. We are unable to accept such contention of the learned Counsel of the petitioners. The decision made by the Central Administrative Tribunal is not sought to be challenged. On the contrary, it has been accepted as final and only a prayer has been made to quantify the benefits of service flowing from the said decision in terms of money under Section 33C(2). Admittedly, the employee is a 'workman' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and benefits arising out of the decision of the Administrative Tribunal can be qualified in terms of money. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it does not appear to us that the jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) is ousted by any special provision to that effect. It may be indicated here that if the legislative history of Section 33C(2) is traced, it will be evident that Section 33C(2) has been incorporated and amended subsequently in order to enable the workman to get the money equivalent of his legitimate dues by way of wages and other benefits of service if it is possible to quantify such dues. The Supreme Court in a series of decisions has indicated that by way of execution the Authority under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act can quantify the benefits of service if such qualification is possible. We have indicated that no specific forum for executing the monetary benefits flowing from the decision of the departmental authority has been prescribed. Under Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, the order passed by the Tribunal can be executed in the same manner in which the order passed by the departmental authority as referred to in Section 20 of the Act can be executed. It does not appear to us that only because an application for contempt may be made before the Tribunal for violation of its order, a workman is precluded from making an application before the Labour Court for quantifying the benefits and dues of his service in terms of money when such benefits or dues are capable of being quantified and rights flowing from service have been adjudicated by a competent authority, namely, the Central Administrative Tribunal. It, therefore, does not appear to us that the decision made by the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) is per se illegal or without jurisdiction, for which interference by this Court is called for. This Application is, therefore, dismissed. (ISS) Application dismissed.