VASUDEV TRIKAMAL BHATT Vs. IBRAHIMBHAI NASHIRBHAI MATIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. J. S. Bhatt the learned Advocate for the petitioner firstly urged that the letter of resignation Annexure D was not tendered to the competent authority and therefore the first part of sec. 46 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1962 was not complied with and so the resignation letter was no resignation letter at all. Under sec. 46 (1) the Sarpanch may resign from his office by tendering his resignation in writing to the competent authority. This means and must mean that the man must deliver either personally or through any agent like post office the letter of resignation intending it to reach the addressee. Letters of resignations are to be construed very strictly.

(2.) A case analogous to the one on hand had arisen before the Division Bench of this Court in the Special Civil Application No. 487 of 1963 decided on 6-9-63 by the Division Bench consisting of Miabhoy and Mehta JJ. as they then were. In that case the letter of resignation was addressed by the one-time president of the Ranpur Municipality to the Commissioner and a copy was endorsed to the municipality by him. As far as the resignation as the President was concerned the Commissioner purported to accept the same but with respect to his resignation as a councillor of the Municipality the Commissioner thought that the matter lay within the powers of the President. A question arose as to whether the said letter of resignation copy of which was endorsed by this President in his capacity as the member to the municipality and not to the President of the municipality was valid resignation or not. The Division Bench in this connection states as follows :

(3.) Mr. Qureshi the learned Advocate for the contending respondents nos. 1 to 3 urged that in the routine course the letter of resignation Annexure A was channelled by the respondent no. 5 to the respondent 6 who was the competent authority but when the law requires that the letter of resignation must be tendered to the competent authority it is implicit that the same should tender either personally or through some agency to the competent authority. Had the letter Annexure A been containing a stipulation that if the Taluka Development Office is not the competent authority. he may hand over the letter of resignation to the competent authority the matter perhaps would have been different. Here the petitioner submitted the letter Annexure A to the Taluka Development Officer thinking that he is the person competent to accept his resignation. Is this view of the matter the impugned order Annexure D cannot be allowed to stand.