RATHWA MOHANSING CHHOTUBHAI Vs. AMARSINGBHAI VIRAYABHAI RATHWA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is not disputed that ever since the amendment in that Act Representation of the People Act the double member and multi-member constituencies have become a matter of the past. Sec. 33(2) was there in this very form in those days and Mr. Advocate General with emphasis urged that the text of sec. 33(2) was such as would be applicable only to the situation where in a constituency there were two or more parts one or more of which was or were reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. He in this connection stressed the word any occurring there. It must be fairly conceded that the word any denotes anyone and when there is reference to one ordinarily there would be reference to two or more seats also. When sec. 33(2) was there prior to the constitution of the single member constituencies it was required to be interpreted to mean that where in a parliamentary constituency any one out of more seats is reserved for candidate of the Scheduled Caste or Tribe the member would be required to specify the specific caste or tribe so that out of a number of candidates in that constituency it could be ascertained at a sheer glance as to who are the candidates for a reserved seat and who are the candidates for a general seat. The argument in so far as it goes to this stage appears to be sound. The further argument of Mr. Advocate General however was that the provisions of sec. 33(2) lost all significance and importance the moment there came to be provided the single member constituencies. He therefore urged that sec. 33(2) should be treated as otiose by me. He for that purpose sought reliance on some observations of the Supreme Courts judgment in T. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora and Ors. AIR 1959 S.C. 1318 already referred to by me. In that case the illustration appended to sec. 54(4) of the R. P. Act 1951 was treated by the Supreme Court as otiose in some respects. Said sec. 54(4) had an illustration which is reproduced below (it is to be noted that this whole sec. 54 has been deleted from the statute by Representation of People Amendment Act 1961 being Act No. 40/61): Illustration: At an election in a constituency to fill four seats of which two are reserved there are six candidates A B C D E and F and they secure votes in descending order A securing the largest number B C and D are qualified to be chosen to fill the reserved seats while A E and F are not so qualified. The Retur- ning Officer will first declare-B and C duly elected to fill the two reserved seats and then declare A and D (not A & B) to fill the remaining two seats. In paragraph 15 of the said reported judgment (V. V. Giris case Supra) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

(2.) Mr. Advocate General in this connection had emphasised the words any seat along with the words that seat occurring in the latter part of that sub-sec. and urged that the phrase that seat was obviously referable to the earlier words any seat. When the Parliament despite the constitution of single member constituency retained sub-sec. (2)of sec. 33 it is more advisable to read the section by reading a for any rather than ignoring the entire statutory provision. Ordinary pre- sumption of law is that the Legislature does not speak anything which is devoid of any meaning. The retention of sec. 33 (2)7 even after 1966 therefore is to be understood to be indicative of the parliaments desire to continue to achieve the earlier purpose of posting the would-be objectionist with the readily available material for his further search and scrutiny so that within a matter of a few days available to him between the date of filing of the nomination papers and the date of scrutiny he collects the requisite material and places it and presses his point.

(3.) As an extension of his argument Mr. Advocate General urged that Article 14 of the Constitution of India would be attracted if one person fills in the form by writing Rathwa in the form and another person does not write so but the form is sufficiently indicative of the man being of that tribe. It is difficult to appreciate this argument. This argument proceeds on the assumption that both the forms are validly accepted. The argument further proceeds on the assumption that further evidence could be led before the Returning Officer in order to make good the deficit if any. When sec. 33 (2) cuts at the nomination forms itself the scope for any invidious different treatment would hardly arise.