MOHAN GANDA Vs. DRIVER GARASIYA KESHUBHAI SHIVUBHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondents in all the four applications are the same. Each of these four petitioners had filed applications under the provisions of Sec. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for compensation claiming amounts as and by was of compensation on account of the injury received by him or her in the course of an accident or by the deceased Bai Monghi Kala. The accident took place on the road from Surendranagar to Rajkot near Morvi Bridge. Respondent No. 1 in each of these petitions was the driver of the truck which was involved in the accident; respondent No. 2 is the owner of the truck and respondent No. 3 is the Insurance Company with whom the appropriate insurance was taken out by the owner. Different amounts were claimed in each of these petitions and ultimately a compromise was entered into and regular compromise pursises were filed in each of the four applications before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Surendranagar. The learned District Judge as such Tribunal recorded the compromise in each of the four matters and thereafter the question arose of the payment of court fees. Under Rule 292 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 (here in after referred to as the Rules) as it then stood an application for compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had to be accompanied by an amount equal to half of ad valorem fee leviable on the amount at which the claim is valued in the application according to the scale prescribed under Article I of Schedule I to the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 provided that if the person making an application succeeds he shall be liable to make good the deficit if any between the full ad valorem fee payable on the amount at which the claim is valued in the application according to the said scale and the fee already paid by him. I am informed that rule 292 has been subsequently amended but I am not concerned with the amended rule 292. The learned District Judge as the Tribunal held that in each of the four cases the remaining one half of the ad valorem fee on the application should be paid by each of the four applicants. He passed this order after hearing the learned advocates for the parties. Thereafter an application was made for the refund of the court fees as the applications had been compromised. The learned District Judge as the Tribunal held that under sec. 43 of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 refund could be ordered only in respect of court fees paid by the plaintiff on the plaint and since this was an application he held that it was not possible to extend the application of sec. 43 of the Court Fees Act to cover refund of the fee paid under rule 292 in respect of the application under the Act and hence the refund of any part of the said fees could not be ordered to the applicant. In each of these Special Civil Applications the petitioner concerned has challenged the validity and legality of the two orders one for the payment of the deficit court fee and the other declining to order refund of the court fee in the light of the compromise orders.

(2.) Since all these four Special Civil Applications involve the same point of law I will dispose of them by this common judgment.

(3.) Mr. Raval for the petitioner did not press the question of inter petition of Rule 292 and hence he has not pressed the challenge to the order Annexure B in each of the four Special Civil Applications asking the applicant in each of the four cases to pay the balance of the ad valorem court fees payable under the proviso to rule 292. The question that has been agitated before me is confined to sec. 43 of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 Sec. 43 of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 provides :