FARSUBHAI ALTAPBHAI SAIYED Vs. DURLABHBHAI BHAGABHAI PATEL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question that arises for determination in this Revision Application is whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain an action instituted by a plaintiff who has not suffered bodily injury as a result of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle but whose property is damaged as a result of the accident. The facts giving rise to the Revision Application are few and may be briefly stated as follows.

(2.) The plaintiff is the owner of a Scooter bearing No. M.R.A. 1305. On 26th April 1967 the Scooter was being driven by a friend of the plaintiff named Kevalbhai Bhagwandas Parmar and there was also one other person sitting behind Kevalbhai Bhagwandas Parmar on the pillion of the scooter. Whilst the scooter was being driven by Kevalbhai Bhagwandas Parmar one motor truck bearing No. G. T. A. 527 collided with it and considerable damage was caused to the scooter as a result of the accident. Kevalbhai Bhagwandas Parmar and the person sitting behind him also received bodily injuries and for claiming compensation for such bodily injuries they filed an application under sec. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 The plaintiff taking the view that he was not entitled to file an application under Sec. 110A for claiming compensation for the damage caused to the scooter instituted suit No. 222 of 1967 in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division Navsari. The plaintiff claimed that the accident was caused on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the motor truck and the plaintiff was entitled to claim damages from the owner and the driver of the motor truck for the loss sustained by him on account of damage to the scooter. The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds one of which was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of sec. 110F and the only remedy of the plaintiff was to make an application for compensation under sec. 110 The defendants invited the learned trial Judge to try the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and since the issue of jurisdiction was a pure issue of law the learned trial Judge tried it as a preliminary issue and came to the conclusion that the claim for compensation made by the plaintiff in the suit was not liable to be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal under sec. 110 and the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit was therefore not excluded. This decision given by the learned trial Judge is assailed in the present Revision Application.

(3.) The question which arises for determination is whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim for compensation made by an owner of property which is damaged in an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The determination of this question depends on a true interpretation of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 Sec. 110 provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court by enacting that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for a any area no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. The jurisdiction of the civil Court is thus excluded only in so far as it concerns any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for the area concerned. It is not any and every claim for compensation which is excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil Court but only such claim as can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. To the extent to which any claim for compensation can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal it would be outside the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It is therefore necessary to examine what is the jurisdiction of the Claims tribunal under the Act. Sec. 110(1) as it stood at the material time prior to its amendment which came into force from 2nd March 1970 provided that the State Government may constitute a Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. The Claims Tribunal would therefore have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim for compensation provided three conditions are satisfied namely (i) the claim for compensation is in respect of an accident; (ii) the accident must be one involving the death of or bodily injury to a person; and (iii) it must arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. Now the words involving the death of or bodily injury to are clearly limitative of accident and they do not limit the nature of the claim for compensation. These words do not require that the claim for compensation must be for death of or bodily injury to a person. The only requirement of the section is that the claim for compensation must be in respect of an accident and the accident must be one involving the death of or bodily injury to a person and it must arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. It would therefore appear on a plain grammatical construction of the section that once there is an accident involving the death of or bodily injury to a person and it has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle every claim for compensation in respect of such accident whether it be for death or bodily injury or for damage to property caused by such accident would be within the adjudicatory power of the Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal would prima facie have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim for compensation made by the plaintiff in the present case since it is plainly and indubitably a claim for compensation in respect of an accident involving bodily injuries to Kevalbhai Bhagwandas Parmar and the person sitting behind him and arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. But it is a well settled rule of interpretation of a statutory provision that it should be construed ex vicarious actus that is within the four corners of the statute. No part of a statute should he construed in isolation for the intention of the Legislature is to be found not in one part of the statute or the other but in the whole of the statute and the meaning of a statutory provision must therefore be gathered reading the statute as a whole. To quote the words of Sir John Nicholl M. R. in Brett v. Brett (1826) 3 Adams 210 :-... to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute the particular phrase is not to be viewed detached from its context in the statute it is to be viewed in connection with its whole context meaning by this as well the title and preamble as the purview or enacting part of the statute. We must therefore see whether there is any other provision in the Act which cuts down the apparent width and amplitude of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Claims Tribunal under Sec. 110(1).