GULABCHAND ZAVERCHAND MEHTA Vs. PATEL KURJI BHAGWANJI KALARIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Second Appeal raises a short question regarding the validity of the notice to quit given by the plaintiff to the defendant. It is an admitted fact that the tenancy of the defendant was from month to month according to the English calendar month. The plaintiff gave to the defendant a notice dated 7th October 1959 calling upon him to quit the premises which were in his possession as a tenant of the plaintiff. The material portion of the notice was when translated in the following terms:

(2.) The defendant failed to hand over possession of the premises to the plaintiff and the plaintiff therefore filed a suit against the defendant on 8 April 1960 to-recover possession of the premises from the defendant. The ground on which possession of the premises was sought by the plaintiff was that he required the premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use and occupation. Various contentions were raised by the defendant in his written statement one of which was that the notice to quit given by the plaintiff to the defendant was not a valid notice. The learned trial Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the notice to quit was a valid notice which effectively terminated the tenancy of the defendant and that the premises were bona fide and reasonably required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation but that greater hardship would be caused to the defendant by passing a decree for possession of the entire premises than what would be caused to the plaintiff by refusing to pass a decree. The learned trial Judge was however satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the plaintiff or to the defendant by passing a decree in respect of one half of the premises. The learned trial Judge accordingly passed a decree awarding possession of one half of the premises to the plaintiff. It appears that both the plaintiff and defendant were aggrieved by the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and they therefore filed appeals against the same The appeals were disposed of by the learned Assistant Judge Gondal who agreeing with the learned trial Judge dismissed both the appeals. The defendant thereupon filed the present second Appeal in this Court and the plaintiff filed Cross-objections in the present appeal.

(3.) The only contention urged by Mr. S M. Shah learned advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant was as regards the validity of the notice to quit given by the plaintiff to the defendant. Mr. S. M. Shah contended that the notice to quit did not put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant at a certain and definite time which expired with the month of the tenancy but sought to terminate the tenancy of the defendant on three alternative dates. This argued Mr. S. M. Shah vitiated the notice to quit and the notice to quit did not therefore. have the effect of terminating the tenancy of the defendant. Now Mr. S. M. Shah is right in his contention that though no particular form of words is necessary the notice to quit must determine the existing tenancy at a certain time. It is well-established that a notice to quit being a unilaterat act in exercise of a contractual right to put an end to an existing relation of landlord and tenant must conform strictly to the requirements of law. A notice to quit is as observed by Lord Greene M. R. in Hankey v. Clavering (1942) 2 All E. R. 311 a document of a technical nature technical for this reason that if it is in a proper form it has of its own force without any assent by the recipient the effect of bringing the tenancy to an end. It is not a consensual document it is a document which must on its face and on a fair and reasonable construction do what the law says that it must do. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that in the case of a tenancy from month to month a notice to quit must give at least fifteen days notice and must expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. It is not in dispute that the notice to quit in the present case gave fifteen days clear notice to the defendant but the only question is whether it can be said that the notice to quit expired at a certain and definite time which was the end of the month of the tenancy. The argument of Mr. S. M. Shah was that there were three alternative dates mentioned in the notice to quit on which the notice to quit expired and the notice to quit therefore suffered from the fault of vagueness and uncertainty and could not be said of expire with the month of the tenancy. This argument is in my opinion fallacious for reasons which I will immediately state Before however I do so I must refer to the well-known rule of construction that a notice to quit though it may not be strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in it may still be good and effective in law the test of sufficiency would be satisfied if the notice to quit conveys to the tenant that his tenancy would be determined at a certain and definite time expiring with the month of the tenancy and the Court Must construe the notice to quit not with a view to finding faults in it which would render it defective but must construe it ut res magis valeat quam pereat.