SURAT DISTRICT PANCHAYAT Vs. DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONER GANDHINAGAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is filed by Surat District Panchayat and the President of that Panchayat for an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the order passed by the Development Commissioner, respondent No. 1 herein on 21/07/1990, Annexure 'D' to the petition.

(2.) The petitioner No. 1 is the District Panchayat constituted under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), while the petitioner No. 2 is the President of the said Panchayat. It is the case * for a writ for quashing the order passed by the Respondent. of the petitioners that in exercise of the powers under Sec. 131 of the Act, certain committees were constituted by the District Panchayat. It is also their case that the over and above the statutory committees envisaged by sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 131, certain temporary committees for execution of works or scheme can be constituted by the Panchayat and accordingly certain additional committees have been constituted by the District Panchayat. Even though the said action was in accordance with law, the respondent No. 1 in the purported exercise of his powers under Sec. 294 of the Act, suspended the execution of the said resolution passed by the District Panchayat, prohibiting it from implementing the said resolution. It is against this order passed by the first respondent that the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) I have heard the arguments of Mr. S. V. Parmar, the learned Counsel for the petitioners. He has contended that the order passed by the first respondent is arbitrary, capricious, null and void, without jurisdiction and de hors the provisions of Sec. 294(5) of the Act. He submitted that the resolution passed by the petitioner-Panchayat cannot be said to be unlawful and, therefore, the provisions of Sec. 294 of the Act cannot be pressed into service by the first respondent and there is inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the first respondent in taking the impugned action under Sec. 294 of the Act. He has further contended that there is an error apparent on the face of the record committed by the first respondent in not properly considering the ambit and scope of Sec. 131 of the Act which authorises and empowers the District Panchayat to constitute committees and the said power cannot be curtailed by the first respondent. He has submitted that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the first respondent has such power, it can be exercised when conditions laid down in sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 294 of the Act are satisfied, namely, that the action of the Panchayat must be causing or likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to lead to a breach of peace. Since none of the conditions laid down in Sec. 294(6) is satisfied, the first respondent cannot exercise power. Mr. Parmar further submitted that constitution of committees is a legislative power and the legislature has conferred the said power on the Panchayat concerned which cannot be obstructed by the executive, that is, officer of the State Government. According to Mr. Parmar, Sec. 131 is directory and not mandatory in nature and even if it is not fully complied with, the action cannot be said to be vitiated on that ground. Mr. Parmar also contended that the impugned order is mala fide, and has been passed in colourable exercise of power at the instance of the State Government, with a view to oblige the opposite group than the party in power in the District Panchayat. In this connection, Mr. Parmar has invited my attention to an earlier order passed by the officer of the first respondent in the year 1983 when the action of the District Panchayat of constitution of certain additional committees was approved by the then Development Commissioner.